Social anxiety and information processing biases: An integrated theoretical perspective

Abstract

Models of anxiety disorders posit that information processing biases towards threat may result from an imbalance between top-down attentional control processes and bottom-up attentional processes, such that anxiety could reduce the influence of the former and increase the influence of the latter. However, researchers have recently pointed to limitations of the top-down/bottom-up terminology and outlined the additional contribution of memory processes to attention guidance. The goal of this paper is to provide bridges between recent findings from cognitive psychology and anxiety disorders research. We first provide an integrative overview of the processes influencing the content of working memory, including the availability of attentional control, and the strengths of task goals, stimulus salience, selection history and long-term memory. We then illustrate the interest of this formulation to the study of information processing biases in anxiety disorders, with a specific focus on social anxiety.

Expectancy influences on attention to threat are only weak and transient: Behavioral and physiological evidence

“…According to Peschard and Philippot (2015), the attentional focus is determined (among other factors) by both task goals and stimulus salience, which closely relates to the notion of topdown versus bottom-up influences on attention deployment (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In the present experiment, the participants' goal was to detect as quickly and rapidly as possible the target, irrespective of the target's nature.…”

“…However, the facilitative effect provided by the cues was restricted to bird targets. Notably, Peschard and Philippot (2015) acknowledge that in some cases it might be necessary to quickly switch attention from task goals to salient sensory input, and they explicitly mention phylogenetic threat as constituting such salient input. The current experiment yields evidence for their postulate by demonstrating that stimulus salience can indeed, at least temporarily, overwrite task goals.…”

“…In fact, the -combined cognitive biases hypothesis‖ ; see also Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012;Ingram, 1984; J. M. G. Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997) states that cognitive biases in psychopathology rarely operate independently but, rather, most often mutually influence each other. Along these lines, Peschard and Philippot (2015) suggested attentional and memory processes in anxiety to be closely connected. According to these authors, it is the focus of attention that determines awareness of working memory content, and the focus of attention should itself be influenced by factors such as task goals, stimulus salience, and long-term memory.…”

Case conceptualization from a process‐based and modular perspective: Rationale and application to mood and anxiety disorders

“…This classification is descriptive and artificially distinguishes between phenomena that permanently interact with each other. For instance, it is well established that deficits in attentional control processes (cognitive domain) negatively impact on emotion regulation (emotion domain; Ehring, ; Peschard & Philippot, ), for instance, in the maintenance of depressive mood and depressogenic repetitive thoughts (Dalgleish et al, ).…”

“…In this general category, one can distinguish between nonreflective processes and reflective processes. Nonreflective cognitive processes, as proposed by Harvey et al (2004), encompass several subdomains such as attention and executive processes (Peschard & Philippot, 2016), memory (overgeneral memory, selective memory, and intrusive memory; van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004), judgement (interpretation, expectation, and reasoning; Wells, 2009), and thinking (repetitive thinking and thought suppression; Watkins, 2008). In all these aspects of cognition, biases or deficits have been demonstrated across several psychopathological conditions.…”