Amartya Sen 2009
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511800511.007
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Social Choice Theory and the Informational Basis Approach

Abstract: Abstract:For over a quarter of a century, the use of utility information based upon interpersonal comparisons has been seen as an escape route from the Arrow Impossibility Theorem. This paper critically examines this informational basis approach to social choice. Even with comparability of differences and levels, feasible social choice rules must be insensitive to a range of distributional issues. Also, the Pareto principle is not solely to blame for the inability to adopt rules combining utility and non-utili… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
9
0
1

Year Published

2017
2017
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
3
2

Relationship

0
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 9 publications
(10 citation statements)
references
References 21 publications
0
9
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…Level comparability allows saying whether one person’s HRQL is better, or worse, than another’s. Unit comparability allows saying whether a change in one person’s HRQL is greater or less than a change in another’s (e.g., one person improves more with a treatment) [18]. …”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Level comparability allows saying whether one person’s HRQL is better, or worse, than another’s. Unit comparability allows saying whether a change in one person’s HRQL is greater or less than a change in another’s (e.g., one person improves more with a treatment) [18]. …”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To construct a societal preference interval ( L , U ), representing society's uncertainty about the value of avoiding a blackout (where in this case “society” is everyone served by the feeder), we must aggregate L i and U i in some way. If L i and U i are measured on an interval scale and individuals are interpersonally comparable so that changes in lower (upper) bounds are equivalent from person to person, the measures satisfy cardinal full comparability (Roberts, ). Because we assume cardinal utilities with full interpersonal comparability, individuals’ preferences can be combined to make social decisions without contradicting Arrow's impossibility theorem, which applies only when individual preferences are ordinal and noncomparable (Arrow, ; Sen, ).…”
Section: Incorporating Preference Uncertainty Into Policy Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead, cardinal full comparability also admits other aggregation rules. Two important ones that yield a transitive social welfare function and provide interesting bounds on what society might care about are the minimum and maximum (Roberts, ; Sen, ). There are arguments for and against each one.…”
Section: Incorporating Preference Uncertainty Into Policy Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Social choice theory is concerned with the principles underlying group choice and group preference when individuals have different preferences over the alternatives [4]. It proposes principles of preference aggregation in the sense that individual preference is to be reflected equitably in group preference, insofar as possible.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%