Social complexity and transitive inference in corvids

Sociality and the evolution of intelligence

“…There are, for example, many avian species that would provide tests of this hypothesis [13]. A recent study compared the performance of the highly social pinyon jay (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) with a much less social close relative, the western scrub jay (Aphelocoma californica) on an operant test of transitive inference [14]. The results showed la arge species difference, as predicted by the social complexity hypothesis.…”

Logic, language and the brain

“…It has been the focus of vigorous investigation within philosophy and psychology (e.g., Beall and van Fraassen, 2003;Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991;Osherson, 1975). While deduction is often regarded as a central feature of human intelligence (Rips, 1994), some forms of deduction (notably, transitive inference) have been reported in nonhuman primates (e.g., Gillian, 1981), rats (e.g., Davis, 1992;Roberts and Phelps, 1994), birds (e.g., Steirn et al, 1995;Bond et al, 2003) and fish (Grosenick et al, 2007). In this report our focus will be deductive reasoning in humans and its neural implementation in the adult brain.…”

Getting one step closer to deduction: Introducing an alternative paradigm for transitive inference

“…A transitive inference allows you to work out that, exceptional circumstances aside, Kerry will struggle running with Jane. The beauty is that you can infer such an outcome, without having already experienced it directly.Many argue that the capacity for transitive inference is logical (i.e., deductive), partly because the conclusion necessarily follows as long as the relation used is a linear comparative term (e.g., "runs faster than"), and partly because we can deduce the conclusion upon simply being told the two premises, rather than having to directly perceive and verify them as true for ourselves.Transitive inference may lay at the heart of a plethora of cognitive and sub-cognitive competencies, from spatial navigation through to predicting where to find food; and from placing oneself within a social network through to scientific thinking (Allen, 2006;Archie et al, 2006;Bond, Kamil & Bolda, 2003;Hummel & Holyoak, 2001;Markovits & Dumas, 1999;Siemann & Delius, 1998;Wright, 1998aWright, , 2001. Further, transitive tasks have been used as a tool in better understanding the similarities and differences between the mental processes of humans and nonhumans (Eichenbaum, 2001;Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006;Wu & Levy, 2001).…”

“…Then, since Bryant and Trabasso's original demonstrations, over 90% of transitive studies have followed the B&T methodology of training participants on at least four premise pairs, for as long as it takes to reach near perfect performance (e.g., Acuna, Sanes & Donoghue, 2002;Holcomb et al, 1997;Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006;Martin & Alsop, 2004;Wright, 2006b). Of great significance, in addition to unexpectedly high performance in other human groups (Maydak, Stromer, Mackay & Stoddard, 1995;Stromer, Mackay, Cohen & Stoddard, 1993), almost any non-human group tested has passed the B&T task: From as large as the beluga whale or the elephant (Archie et al, 2006;Murayama & Tobayama, 1997) to as small as the jay or honey bee (Bond et al, 2003;Shafir et al, 2002).Despite highly contrasting findings between the B&T task and its 3-term predecessor (e.g., on age of reaching competence), many insist B&T tasks target precisely the same "logical" competence as the Piagetian task (Acuna et al, 2002;Bouwmeester et al, 2007;Bryant, 1998;Halford & Andrews, 2004;Yamazaki, 2004). Intriguingly, no theorist seems yet to have offered any rationale for exactly why the B&T task which requires 10 premises to be stored in memory, involves five interlinked items, and tests for no less than six inferences, should either be equivalent to or easier to solve than the 3-term task requiring only one inference to be made.…”