Social context congestion games

Bilò, Vittorio; Celi, Alessandro; Flammini, Michele; Gallotti, Vasco

doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2012.10.041

Cited by 15 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Our work on linear congestion games generalizes a result in [1]. They show that the pure price of anarchy does not exceed 17/3 in a restricted friendship setting (α ij ∈ {0, 1}).…”

Section: Related Worksupporting

confidence: 66%

“…Several articles propose models of altruism and spite [1,3,4,5,6,7,11,14,15,16]. Among these articles, the inefficiency of equilibria in the presence of altruism and spite was studied for various games in [1,4,5,6,7,11]. After its introduction in [21], the smoothness framework has been extended to incomplete information settings [22,24,25] and altruism/spite settings [7,19].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games

Rahn

Schäfer

2013

Web and Internet Economics

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Abstract. We introduce a new class of games, called social contribution games (SCGs), where each player's individual cost is equal to the cost he induces on society because of his presence. Our results reveal that SCGs constitute useful abstractions of altruistic games when it comes to the analysis of the robust price of anarchy. We first show that SCGs are altruism-independently smooth, i.e., the robust price of anarchy of these games remains the same under arbitrary altruistic extensions. We then devise a general reduction technique that enables us to reduce the problem of establishing smoothness for an altruistic extension of a base game to a corresponding SCG. Our reduction applies whenever the base game relates to a canonical SCG by satisfying a simple social contribution boundedness property. As it turns out, several well-known games satisfy this property and are thus amenable to our reduction technique. Examples include min-sum scheduling games, congestion games, secondprice auctions and valid utility games. Using our technique, we derive mostly tight bounds on the robust price of anarchy of their altruistic extensions. For the majority of the mentioned game classes, the results extend to the more differentiated friendship setting. As we show, our reduction technique covers this model if the base game satisfies three additional natural properties.

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“…Our work on linear congestion games generalizes a result in [1]. They show that the pure price of anarchy does not exceed 17/3 in a restricted friendship setting (α ij ∈ {0, 1}).…”

Section: Related Worksupporting

confidence: 66%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games

Rahn

Schäfer

2013

Web and Internet Economics

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“…In [29], the authors consider resource selection games as the underlying game and they study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Building on this model, Bilò et al [30] investigate social context games in which the underlying games are linear congestion games and Shapley cost sharing games, while the aggregation functions are min, max and sum. Moreover, Anagnostopoulos et al [31] study the effects of the altruistic behavior of players showing that the price of anarchy may increase as the players become more altruistic.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Social Context

Monaco

Moscardelli

Velaj

2021

Games

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In hedonic games, coalitions are created as a result of the strategic interaction of independent players. In particular, in additively separable hedonic games, every player has valuations for all other ones, and the utility for belonging to a coalition is given by the sum of the valuations for all other players belonging to it. So far, non-cooperative hedonic games have been considered in the literature only with respect to totally selfish players. Starting from the fundamental class of additively separable hedonic games, we define and study a new model in which, given a social graph, players also care about the happiness of their friends: we call this class of games social context additively separable hedonic games (SCASHGs). We focus on the fundamental stability notion of Nash equilibrium, and study the existence, convergence and performance of stable outcomes (with respect to the classical notions of price of anarchy and price of stability) in SCASHGs. In particular, we show that SCASHGs are potential games, and therefore Nash equilibria always exist and can be reached after a sequence of Nash moves of the players. Finally, we provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of SCASHGs.

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“…The model of de Keijzer et al [13], hence, coincides with a social context game in which the social context graph has weighted edges and the aggregating function is a weighted sum. The issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria for the case of social context linear congestion games have been considered by Bilò et al [6]. In particular, for the aggregating function sum, pure Nash equilibria are shown to exist for each social context graph via an exact potential function argument and the price of anarchy is shown to fall within the interval [5; 17/3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context

Bilò

2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer et al. [13]. In such a framework, given a real matrix Γ = (γij) specifying a particular social context, each player i aims at optimizing a linear combination of the payoffs of all the players in the game, where, for each player j, the multiplicative coefficient is given by the value γij. We give a broad characterization of the social contexts for which pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist and provide tight or almost tight bounds on their prices of anarchy and stability. In some of the considered cases, our achievements either improve or extend results previously known in the literature.

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Social context congestion games

Cited by 15 publications

References 11 publications

Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games

Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games

Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Social Context

On Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context

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