Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

Abstract

We examined how people use social and verbal cues of di}ering priorities in making social decisions[ In Experiment 0\ formally identical lifeÐdeath choice problems were presented in di}erent hypothetical group contexts and were phrased in either a positive or negative frame[ The risk!seeking choice became more domi! nant as the number of kin in an endangered group increased[ Framing e}ects occurred only in a heterogeneous group context where the lives at risk were a mixture of kin and strangers[ No framing e}ect was found when the same problem was presented in the context of a homogeneous group consisting of either all kin or all strangers[ We viewed the framing e}ects to be a sign of indecisive risk preference due to the di}erential e}ects of a kinship cue and a stranger cue on choice[ In Experiment 1\ we presented the lifeÐdeath problem in two arti_cial group contexts involving either 5 billion human lives or 5 billion extraterrestrial lives[ A framing e}ect was found only in the human context[ Two pre!conditions of framing e}ects appear to be social unfamiliarity of a decision problem and aspiration level of a decision maker[ In Experiment 2\ we analyzed the direction of the framing e}ect by balancing the framing[ The direction of the framing e}ect depended on the baseline level of risk preference determined by a speci_c decision context[

Management of Investor Acceptance in Wind Power Megaprojects: A Conceptual Perspective

“…Wang and Johnston, 1995;Wang et al, 2001). A social phenomenon in financial markets is, for instance, herding, which refers to the behavior that investors are influenced by other investors' decisions.…”

Group size and the framing effect:

“…A low degree of value, like those for the animal scenarios in the neutral condition in this study, the alien condition of the Wang et al (2001) study, and the culpable AIDS patients condition of the Levin and Chapman (1990) study, results in frame failing to affect choice, and in preferences near neutral or risk averse in both frames. This situation, as mentioned above, may be explained by the relationship between participants' value for the group at stake and the shape of the value function.…”

“…Wang, Simons, and Brédart (2001) found significant framing effects for human lives (36% choice of the risky option in the positive frame, 66% in the negative frame) but no difference in the preference for the risky option between frames for extraterrestrial lives (52% choice of the risky option in both frames). They suggested that participants lacked an aspiration for saving alien lives, as opposed to human lives, and that this led to near neutral choices in both frames.…”

“…Although studies such as Tanner and Medin's (2004) and McElroy and Seta's (2003) suggest that greater value for an outcome reduces the effect of frame, the findings of Wang et al (2001) and Levin and Chapman (1990), as well as the predictions of prospect theory, suggest that value for what is at stake is also required for framing effects to appear in the first place. To address this issue, in the present study we explored framing effects by using groups that should be less valuable to the participants, as well as a human group, and we introduced a manipulation intended to increase the value of the group members for the participants.…”

Exploring Cognitive Biases Limiting Rational Problem Solving and Debiasing Methods Using Science Education

“…진화 수용에 관한 의사결정에서 지식이 아닌 앎에 대한 주관적 느낌에 근거한다는 Ha et al(2012) (Walton, 1999). 인지편향은 유아기 에 발달심리학적으로 나타나기 시작하지만 사회적 활동을 통하여 강 화되는 특성도 보고되고 있으므로 교정을 위한 가장 효율적인 방법은 성장기의 교육을 통해서 일 것이다 (Wang et al, 2001). 최근 탈인지편 향에 대한 훈련전략을 연구하는 Morewedge et al(2015) (Hodgson, 2004).…”