Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games

Santos, Francisco C.; Santos, Marta D.; Pacheco, Jorge M.

doi:10.1038/nature06940

Cited by 1,267 publications

(1,024 citation statements)

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“…A multi-player Hawk-Dove game was considered in Broom and Rychtář (2012), and multi-player Public Goods games were considered in a number of papers: Hauert et al (2002), Milinski et al (2006), Santos et al (2008), Ihara (2009), Souza et al (2009), Pacheco (2011), van Veelen andNowak (2012), Kurokawa and Ihara (2013). In order to model this more general type of interaction between individuals, Broom and Rychtář (2012) developed a new framework to analyse multi-player games in networks involving groups of different sizes.…”

Section: Modelling Structured Populations With Multi-player Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions

et al. 2015

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Citation: Broom, M., Lafaye, C., Pattni, K. & Rychtar, J. (2015). A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions.. Journal of Mathematical Biology, doi: 10.1007/s00285-015-0868-1 This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Abstract Recently, the study of structured populations using models of evolutionary processes on graphs has begun to incorporate a more general type of interaction between individuals, allowing multi-player games to be played among the population. In this paper, we develop a birth-death dynamics for use in such models and consider the evolution of populations for special cases of very small graphs where we can easily identify all of the population states and carry out exact analyses. To do so, we study two multi-player games, a Hawk-Dove game and a public goods game. Our focus is on finding the fixation probability of an individual from one type, cooperator or defector in the case of the public goods game, within a population of the other type. We compare this value for both games on several graphs under different parameter values and assumptions, and identify some interesting general features of our model. In particular there is a very close relationship between the fixation probability and the mean temperature, with high temperatures helping fitter individuals and punishing unfit ones and so enhancing selection, whereas low temperatures give a levelling effect which suppresses selection. Permanent

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Section: Modelling Structured Populations With Multi-player Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions

et al. 2015

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“…Such a strategy is known as bet hedging (Philippi and Seger, 1989;Ellner, 2009). Its role in cooperation has remained unexplored, although there is interest in variation as cooperation-enhancing mechanism (Wagner, 2003;McNamara et al, 2004;Helbing, 2008;Santos et al, 2008). In the human setting many variations occur that can be alleviated through cooperation.…”

Section: Bet Hedging Based Sharing Is An Evolutionarily Stable Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

Uitdehaag¹

2011

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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International audienceMutualism is a mechanism of cooperation in which partners that differ help each other. As such, mutualism opposes mechanisms of kin selection and tag-based selection (for example the green beard mechanism), which are based on giving exclusive help to partners who are related or carry the same tag. In contrast to kin selection, which is a basis for parochialism and intergroup warfare, mutualism can therefore be regarded as a mechanism that drives peaceful coexistence between different groups and individuals. Here the competition between mutualism and kin (tag) selection is studied. In a model where kin selection and tag-based selection are dominant, mutualism is promoted by introducing environmental fluctuations. These cause reduction in reproductive success by the mechanism of variance discount. The best strategy to counter variance discount is to share with agents who experience the most anticorrelated fluctuations, a strategy called bet hedging. In this way, bet hedging stimulates cooperation with the most unrelated partners, which is a basis for mutualism. Analytic results and simulations reveal that, if this effect is large enough, mutualistic strategies can dominate kin selective strategies. In addition, mutants of these mutualistic strategies that experience fluctuations that are more anticorrelated to their partner, can outcompete wild type, which can lead to the evolution of specialization. In this way, the evolutionary success of mutualistic strategies can be explained by bet hedging-based cooperation

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“…agents cooperate only if the number of defectors are less than a certain threshold (Szolnoki and Perc (2010a)). Another important factor that influences the cooperation is the group size (Szolnoki and Perc (2011), Isaac and Walker (1988)) and/or the interaction among agents (Szolnoki et al (2009), Santos et al (2008)), since there is not a clear effect of the size on contribution, i.e. not in every case we observe that the larger the group, the lower the contribution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a Public Good Game

Colasante

2017

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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This paper presents an investigation about cooperation in a Public Good Game using an Agent Based Model calibrated on experimental data. Starting from the experiment proposed in Colasante and Russo (2016), we analyze the dynamic of cooperation in a Public Good Game where agents receive an heterogeneous income and choose both the level of contribution and the distribution rule. The starting point is the calibration and the output validation of the model using the experimental results. Once tested the goodness of fit of the Agent Based Model, we run some policy experiment in order to verify how each distribution rule, i.e. equidistribution, proportional to contribution and progressive, affects the level of contribution in the simulated model. We find out that the share of cooperators decreases over time if we exogenously set the equidistribution rule. On the contrary, the share of cooperators converges to 100% if we impose the progressive rule. Finally, the most interesting result refers to the effect of the progressive rule. We observe that, in the case of high inequality, this rule is not able to reduce the heterogeneity of income.

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Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games

Cited by 1,267 publications

References 28 publications

A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions

A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions

Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a Public Good Game

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