2010
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9632-7
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Social divisions and institutions: assessing institutional parameter variation

Abstract: This paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions. It argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness, which in turn should depress institutional payoffs. Absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions, social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and inco… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Furthermore, what should matter for agents' attitudes and behaviour is perceived rather than de-facto ethnic bias in aid delivery (see the discussion in Isaksson, 2011). Irrespective of de-facto ethnic bias, citizens may perceive their group as being disadvantaged and mobilize ethnic identities accordingly.…”
Section: Chinese Development Finance and Risk Of Ethnic Biasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, what should matter for agents' attitudes and behaviour is perceived rather than de-facto ethnic bias in aid delivery (see the discussion in Isaksson, 2011). Irrespective of de-facto ethnic bias, citizens may perceive their group as being disadvantaged and mobilize ethnic identities accordingly.…”
Section: Chinese Development Finance and Risk Of Ethnic Biasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Extractive institutions tend to persist because it is in the interest of those in power. Isaksson (2011) argues that social divisions have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness, which in turn should depress institutional payoffs. Empirical estimations confirm a weaker association between property rights and economic performance in societies marked by social divisions.…”
Section: Inequality and Inclusive Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Compared with 1960 illustrated in Figure 8 A secured property right is considered to provide an incentive to invest and therefore creates capital accumulation. Isaksson (2011) used cross-countries data to present evidence that social division measured in terms of ethnic fractionalization weakens the association between property rights institutions and income. If this is true, then heterogeneity reduces the incentive to invest even when property rights are well secured.…”
Section: Data and Estimation Strategymentioning
confidence: 99%