Social Engineering Attacks on Government Opponents: Target Perspectives

Abstract

New methods of dissident surveillance employed by repressive nation-states increasingly involve socially engineering targets into unwitting cooperation (e.g., by convincing them to open a malicious attachment or link). While a fair amount is understood about the nature of these threat actors and the types of tools they use, there is comparatively little understood about targets' perceptions of the risks associated with their online activity, and their security posture. We conducted in-depth interviews of 30 potential targets of Middle Eastern and Horn of Africa-based governments, also examining settings and software on their computers and phones. Our engagement illuminates the ways that likely targets are vulnerable to the types of social engineering employed by nation-states.

On Enforcing the Digital Immunity of a Large Humanitarian Organization

“…We find that the ability of humanitarian field workers to carry out their mandate hinges on numerous operational and legal factors such as developing capacity by training local workers, operating in local, untrusted facilities, and negotiating and maintaining bilateral agreements with local authorities. These factors tend to differ from other at-risk groups such as political dissidents [23], [22], [27], [15], [26] and journalists [29], [30], [24] whose activities can be carried out individually, or in small groups, with no or little support from authorities. As a result, whereas journalists generally depend on their own security practices and that of their sources, humanitarian workers must consider a multitude of other factors such as the engagement, acceptance, and trustworthiness of the local actors and infrastructure, the confidentiality of their physical location, and the specific Privileges and Immunities (P&I) recognized in their delegation's bilateral agreement.…”

“…Although this study shares similarities with recent work on computer security for political dissidents and journalists, humanitarian action differs in terms of organizational structure, data flows, and threat models. First, unlike political dissidents who often act individually or as part of small nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) [23], [22], [27], [15], [26], to be effective, humanitarian action needs considerable logistical support, generally from a large organization, which significantly complicates the security of the corresponding data flows. In this respect, humanitarian action is more akin to journalism for large media outlets.…”

The Effects Of Social Engineering On Enterprise Security

“…Studies outlined the complex nature of social engineering and enterprise security but have not fully explored the value each component could provide an organization. Moreover, the review of literature facilitates discussions on the characterization of a social engineer, explanations of the social engineering and design process, and what social engineers do (Marczak & Paxson, 2017). Even though Weaver, Furr, and Norton (Wardono et al, 2017) outlined a convenient historical perspective of engineering ethics, inconsistencies still exist pertaining to what social engineers do.…”

The Motivated Can Encrypt (Even with PGP)

“…Activists, journalists and lawyers have a need to use secure communication technology, specifically email, but often face obstacles in adoption [25]. E2EE messengers such as Signal [21] provide easier-to-use alternatives, but because these tools lack certain functionality, users continue to opt for less secure alternatives in order to work effectively [1,5,26,29,33].…”