Social Expenditure Under Scrutiny: The Problems of Using Aggregate Spending Data for Assessing Welfare State Dynamics

Deken, Johan De; Kittel, Bernhard

doi:10.4337/9781847206916.00014

Cited by 47 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…Second, we turn the analytical arrow by investigating the impact of social expenditure on trade union density (with the same test for impact in different types of political economies). Although time horizons for expected impacts on different kinds of expenditure is expected to vary, we follow the common practice of including a time-lag specification of the key explanatory variables by one year to allow for capturing delayed effects (De Deken and Kittel 2007). Additional analyses that were conducted with time lags of two and three years yield consistent findings.…”

Section: Analysis and Findingsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Trade union density and social expenditure: a longitudinal analysis of policy feedback effects in OECD countries, 1980–2010

Hooghe¹,

Oser²

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

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Two causal mechanisms have been invoked to explain the positive correlation between union membership and social expenditure. Unions try to influence policy, but they are also more successful in mobilizing members in economic systems in which actors engage in coordinated strategic interaction. Applying insights from the policy feedback and comparative capitalism literatures, our analysis indicates that union density is a determinant of social expenditure. A strong policy feedback effect is also present whereby social expenditure has a positive effect on union density. We find a positive effect of union density on social expenditure in coordinated market economies (CME's), but not in liberal market economies (LME's). We discuss the implications of these findings for citizens' capacity to influence policy in varied contexts and for the 'varieties of capitalism' literature, and we close with some speculation about the implications of these findings in the current economic downturn.

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Section: Analysis and Findingsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Trade union density and social expenditure: a longitudinal analysis of policy feedback effects in OECD countries, 1980–2010

Hooghe¹,

Oser²

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…The final model covers the period from 2008 to 2012, which provides an assessment of the influence of party ideology since the start of the Great Recession. The choice of social expenditure as a dependent variable for assessing changes in welfare spending has been criticized by some scholars (De Deken & Kittel, ). Continuing that debate is beyond the scope of this article; however, the concern of this research is how governing parties reacted to a severe recession.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of social spending after the Great Recession: The return of partisan policy making

Savage

2018

Governance

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Prior research shows that the effect of partisanship on social expenditure declined over time in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries. In this article, the author argues that the 2007/2008 recession resulted in the reemergence of partisan policy making in social spending. This was a result of mainstream parties needing to respond to the growing challenge from nonmainstream parties as well as demonstrating that they responded to the economic crisis by offering different policy solutions. Using a panel of 23 OECD countries, the author shows that since the Great Recession, partisan effects on social spending are once again significant. These effects are more likely to be observed where the salience of the Left–Right dimension is higher. In accordance with classic theories of economic policy making, left‐wing governments are more likely to increase social spending when unemployment is higher and right‐wing governments restrain social expenditure when the budget deficit is greater.

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“…For left parties, the coding follows the classification scheme from the Comparative Parties Dataset. Third, there are issues of consistency in how the OECD measures various data (De Deken and Kittel, 2007). 4 Veto points are an additive index of federalism (none, weak, strong), bicameralism (absent, weak, strong), presidentialism (absent, present), and use of popular referenda.…”

Section: Data Measurement and Analytic Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making markets with active labor market policies: the influence of political parties, welfare state regimes, and economic change on spending on different types of policies

Nelson

2012

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Active labor market policies consist of a diverse set of policy tools with which to address joblessness and the degree to which governments invest in various policies as a response to rising unemployment varies widely. Fleshing out the determinants by policy type holds the promise of illuminating more clearly contestation over activation. To this end, this study analyzes the role of partisanship as well as welfare state regimes and the economy on spending patterns. We begin by detailing a theoretical framework for understanding variation in active labor market policies. Bonoli categorizes active labor market policies according to their market orientation and emphasis on human capital investment. In a study of social service reforms, Gingrich explains how all parties employ market-based reforms to empower some groups over others. These theories are then used to derive partisan hypotheses for direct job creation, training, labor market services, and employment incentives. Hypotheses for the four main types of active labor market policies are tested with regression analysis of 22 countries between 1985 and 2008. High spending on direct job creation, a non-market oriented policy type, is marginally significantly higher in the social democratic regime and by left governments prior to the activation turn. Left parties spend significantly more than other parties on training policies and after the activation turn these policies also become a distinct feature of the social democratic welfare state regime. The same trend exists for employment incentives. Center-right parties and those within the Christian democratic regime also spend marginally significantly higher on training policies before the activation turn, which is explained by results for deindustrialization. No partisan or regime effects are found for labor market services, which supports the view that all countries rely on these policies. The literature also suggests that a composite measure masks political conflict since this policy type encompasses diverse policies.

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Social Expenditure Under Scrutiny: The Problems of Using Aggregate Spending Data for Assessing Welfare State Dynamics

Cited by 47 publications

References 0 publications

Trade union density and social expenditure: a longitudinal analysis of policy feedback effects in OECD countries, 1980–2010

Trade union density and social expenditure: a longitudinal analysis of policy feedback effects in OECD countries, 1980–2010

The politics of social spending after the Great Recession: The return of partisan policy making

Making markets with active labor market policies: the influence of political parties, welfare state regimes, and economic change on spending on different types of policies

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