This paper discusses two common arguments for the adoption of a UBI: that it can be a more effective way of supporting low-income households when existing safety net programs are inefficient, and that it can generate broad support for structural reforms. Using India as an illustration, the paper discusses the trade-offs that need to be recognized in adopting a UBI in these contexts. It shows that replacing the 2011 Public Distribution System (PDS) with a UBI results in welfare losses for many low-income households, although much of this can be reduced by returning the PDS operational losses and the fiscal savings from excluding the highest-income groups to households as higher UBI transfers. In contrast, replacing inefficient energy subsidiesraising energy prices to efficient-could simultaneously deliver unambiguous distributional gains, help address fiscal pressures, and improve energy efficiency with associated environmental and health gains. Realizing such reforms would, of course, require careful communication and implementation to address political and social barriers to reform.