Social identity and voting behavior

Ben-Bassat, Avi; Dahan, Momi

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9742-2

Cited by 51 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Indeed, Andersen et al (2014) observe that turnout in Norwegian local elections is higher in jurisdictions with high hydropower income. Alternative explanations suggest that voting is driven by ethical concerns (Harsanyi, 1980;Coate and Conlin, 2004), social pressure (Gerber et al, 2008;Funk, 2010), expressive motivations (Brennan and Buchanan, 1984;Brennan and Hamlin, 1998;Coate et al, 2008;Hillman, 2010), or social identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2012;Hillman et al, 2015).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Pocketbook Voting, Social Preferences, and Expressive Motives in Referenda

2017

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We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and expressive motives. Our model implies that if pocketbook benets are relevant, voters either perceive their impact on the outcome to be non-negligible, or expressive motivations do not play a role in the decision on how to vote. Conversely, if own pocketbook benets do not explain voting, then voting is expressive. If the perceived probability of being pivotal is non-negligible, social preferences and expressive concerns are observationally equivalent. Our empirical analysis studies collective choices which are analogous to decisions on local public goods. We consider referenda among university students on whether to collectively purchase deeply discounted at rate tickets for public transportation and cultural amenities. Individual usage data allow quantifying the monetary benets associated with each ticket.As voters had precise information on the individual costs and benets, our setting comprises a real-world laboratory of direct democracy. We nd that monetary benets strongly inuence participation and voting. However, social or expressive motives, such as stated altruism, environmental concerns, and paternalism, are decisive for a signicant minority. Our results rule out purely expressive voting and imply that a substantial share of the electorate perceived their impact on the outcome to be non-negligible.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Pocketbook Voting, Social Preferences, and Expressive Motives in Referenda

2017

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“…Based on the data for consanguineous marriage and the evidence from Ben Bassat and Dahan (2012) that extended-family members vote for a candidate from their own extended-family, the prediction is that voter turnout increases with the share of Muslim and Druze populations in a local-government election. Voter turnout is predicted to be less sensitive to the share of the Christian population.…”

Section: Group Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most commonly, the source of group identity is the extended family or clan. Ben Bassat and Dahan (2012) matched family names of voters to family names of candidates using data from elections in 2003 to show that voting in local elections was based on extended-family identity (which they describe using the Arabic term 'hamula'). 7 The Jewish population in general does not tend to live in a structure of extended families and does have the opportunity to vote for a member of an extended family as a candidate for political office (or to vote for a candidate who extended families have agreed to support).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 The Jewish population in general does not tend to live in a structure of extended families and does have the opportunity to vote for a member of an extended family as a candidate for political office (or to vote for a candidate who extended families have agreed to support). We attribute individualistic identity to Jewish voters and draw on our own empirical results from elections in 2007/8/9 and the prior research of Ben Bassat and Dahan (2012) on elections in Israel in 2003 as background for studying voter behavior with group and individualistic identity. 8 Section 2 considers voting incentives distinguishing between expressive and instrumental motives for voting (Fiorina, 1976;Hillman, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also consider incentives for inclusiveness in government when voters have group 7 The research was facilitated by the extended family tending to live together in the same neighborhood and to vote at the same polling station. 8 The data for our study and also Ben Bassat and Dahan (2012) were for citizens of the state of Israel. The population under the auspices of the government of the Palestinian Authority was not part of our study.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Democracy with group identity

Hillman

Metsuyanim²,

Potrafke

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Democracy with Group Identity Abstract Group-based identity undermines democracy by impeding democratic change of government. A substantial literature has therefore studied how to make democracy consistent with group identity. We contribute to this literature by introducing the role of group decisiveness into voting incentives and mobilization of voters. In the elections that we study, for the same populations, accounting for income and other influences, group identity increased voter turnout on average by some 8 percentage points in local elections and decreased voter turnout by some 20 percentage points in national elections. We empirically investigate the effect of group identity on voter turnout and also evaluate whether group identity resulted in budgetary imbalance or replacement of local government because of disfunctionality. Our general contribution is to show how democracy can persist with group identity, although democracy in such instances differs from usual political competition. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D030, D720, D740, H770.

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The Arab Palestinian Minority Within a Diverse, Multiethnic, Militarized Society in Israel

Akirav

2024

Comparative Studies of Political Agendas

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Social identity and voting behavior

Abstract: Voter turnout, Paradox of voting, Social identity, Local elections,

Cited by 51 publications

References 33 publications

Pocketbook Voting, Social Preferences, and Expressive Motives in Referenda

Pocketbook Voting, Social Preferences, and Expressive Motives in Referenda

Democracy with group identity

The Arab Palestinian Minority Within a Diverse, Multiethnic, Militarized Society in Israel

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