Social Image Concerns and Welfare Take-Up

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. Terms of use: Documents inCopyright remains with the authors. AbstractSocial Image Concerns and Welfare Take-Up by Jana Friedrichsen, Tobias König and Renke Schmacker * Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live of others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of "taxpayers" vote for the public transfer.

Who's declining the “free lunch”? New evidence from the uptake of public child dental benefits

“…17 The negative correlation between income or private health insurance and uptake suggests that those with greater economic need do take up more intended benefits. Consistent with the wider literature on income/benefit effects in welfare participation, we refer to this negative relationship as evidence of welfare stigma in the uptake of the two child dental benefit programs (Friedrichsen et al 2018). 18 Our finding of a negative impact of household income on the take-up of public child dental benefits in Australia is in line with evidence of a negative association between income and uptake of other public programs such as Housing Benefit in the UK (Blundell et al 1988) and the Head Start program in the US (Currie & Thomas 1995) or National School Lunch program in the US (Hoynes & Schanzenbach 2016).…”

Talk or type? The effect of digital interfaces on citizens' satisfaction with standardized public services

“…Stigmatization can have severe negative consequences as individuals eligible for a social benefit program might avoid applying for it to avoid being associated with this program (Pinker & Pinker 2017). This mechanism contributes to the non‐take‐up of social benefits, which ultimately harms eligible citizens (Friedrichsen et al 2018; Vinck et al 2019). Concerning service satisfaction, it is presumed that psychological costs decrease citizens' satisfaction in public service encounters.…”

Equal opportunities for all? How income redistribution promotes support for economic inclusion

“…While these tests are underpowered, the fact that 95 percent of the low-endowment subjects support economic inclusion suggests that the game was not overly complicated for subjects and material incentives were fairly clear. Using our survey data, we also checked whether ideological predispositions (Stuber and Schlesinger 2006;Friedrichsen, König, and Schmacker 2018) such as opinions about the social acceptability of income inequality or a potentially stigmatizing effect of receiving social welfare transfers explain the puzzle. We also find no evidence in support for that hypothesis (Fisher's exact tests, p > 0.1, n = 14), which, again, might be due to the low power of the tests.…”