Social Influence and Different Types of Red-Light Behaviors among Cyclists

Abstract

Accident analysis and studies on traffic revealed that cyclists’ violation of red-light regulation is one typical infringement committed by cyclists. Furthermore, an association between cyclists’ crash involvement and red-light violations has been found across different countries. The literature on cyclists’ psychosocial determinants of red-light violation is still scarce. The present study, based on the classification of cyclists’ red-light behavior in risk-taking (ignoring the red-light and traveling through the junction without stopping), opportunistic (waiting at red-lights but being too impatient to wait for green signal and subsequently crossing the junction), and law-obeying (stopping to obey the red-light), adopted an eye-observational methodology to investigate differences in cyclists’ crossing behavior at intersections, in relation to traffic light violations and the presence of other cyclists. Based on the social influence explanatory framework, which states that people tend to behave differently in a given situation taking into consideration similar people’s behaviors, and that the effect of social influence is related to the group size, we hypothesized that the number of cyclists at the intersection will have an influence on the cyclists’ behavior. Furthermore, cyclists will be more likely to violate in an opportunistic way when other cyclists are already committing a violation. Two researchers at a time registered unobtrusively at four different intersections during morning and late afternoon peak hour traffic, 1381 cyclists approaching the traffic light during the red phase. The 62.9% violated the traffic control. Results showed that a higher number of cyclists waiting at the intersection is associated with fewer risk-taking violations. Nevertheless, the percentage of opportunistic violation remained high. For the condition of no cyclist present, risk-taking behaviors were significantly higher, whereas, they were significantly lower for conditions of two to four and five or more cyclists present. The percentage of cyclists committing a red-light violation without following any other was higher for those committing a risk-taking violation, whereas those following tended to commit opportunistic violations more often.

Cyclists as a minority group?

“…Moreover, minorities perceived as especially consistent in the advocacy of their views can be especially influential. Social influence processes among road users (Fraboni, Marin Puchades, De Angelis, Prati, & Pietrantoni, 2016) should also be taken into account in future studies on travel behavior and road safety.…”

A Random Parameter Logit Model of Immediate Red-Light Running Behavior of Pedestrians and Cyclists at Major-Major Intersections

“…Some research findings indicated that the rate of red-light running (RLR) of pedestrians and cyclists was pretty high. In Italy, more than 60% riders were observed to run the red light [2]. Johnson et al [3] investigated 2,061 cyclists and 37.3% of them were reported to have ever run a red light.…”

“…In Canada, 11% of cyclist crashes were caused by disobeying a stop sign or a red light [7]. 2 Journal of Advanced Transportation increasing attention of researchers. To improve the safety level of signalized intersections in the city, there is a need to further analyze and summarize the RLR behaviour of pedestrians and cyclists and then propose suggestions on management and control strategy.…”

The effect of an italian nationwide mandatory visibility aids law for cyclists

“…Second, cyclists did not comply with the legislation. Although there is evidence that a proportion of Italian cyclists do not follow some basic traffic rules such as traffic lights (Fraboni et al, 2016), the number of cyclists that ignored the visibility aids law, and hence the size of the behavior change, is unknown. Drawing from classical deterrence theory (Bates et al, 2012;Fleiter et al, 2013;Homel, 1988), I argue that cyclists may have not complied with the law because the expected costs from violations (e.g., certain, swift, and severe fine sanctions) are perceived lower than the costs of adhering (i.e., having to wear high-vis clothing, which may be considered cumbersome or unfashionable or embarrassing or inconvenient or not having it with you) as well as their gains (e.g., safety).…”