2010
DOI: 10.3368/le.86.4.766
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Social Interaction in Responsibility Ascription: The Case of Household Recycling

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Cited by 94 publications
(82 citation statements)
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“…The effect of information can also be catalyzed in combination with other instruments. This is also in line with the results of Brekke et al [81] indicating that perceived responsibility is a determinant for reported recycling behavior, but also that uncertainty in the information for example about other people's behavior could cause reluctance to accept responsibility. Also Bruvoll and Nyborg [82] conclude that people are willing to conform to social norms, even if it comes with perceived costs in terms of time or work.…”
Section: Results Of the Evaluationsupporting
confidence: 81%
“…The effect of information can also be catalyzed in combination with other instruments. This is also in line with the results of Brekke et al [81] indicating that perceived responsibility is a determinant for reported recycling behavior, but also that uncertainty in the information for example about other people's behavior could cause reluctance to accept responsibility. Also Bruvoll and Nyborg [82] conclude that people are willing to conform to social norms, even if it comes with perceived costs in terms of time or work.…”
Section: Results Of the Evaluationsupporting
confidence: 81%
“…The importance of non-monetary incentives in waste recycling has already been emphasized in literature (Berglund, 2006;Brekke et al 2003Brekke et al , 2007Brekke et al , 2010Hage et al 2009;Halvorsen, 2008). Kinnaman (2006) indeed suggests that the benefits of recycling households are increased more by warm-glow incentives than by unit-based pricing, to the point that households may even be willing to pay for the opportunity to recycle 7 .…”
Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, people donate anonymously to charities (Eckel and Grossman 1996), they vote for reasons of civic duty, despite their vote being extremely unlikely pivotal (Riker and Ordeshook 1968); they respect the law (Cooter 2000) also if incentives that back up the obligations are weak (Galbiati and Vertova 2008). People pay their taxes despite low detection probabilities for evasion (Kirchler 2007), and people also care for the environment out of moral convictions (Brekke, Kipperberg, and Nyborg 2010 interesting field study) and also act on perceived moral obligations (Schwartz 1977). As shown above, in experiments people make contributions to one-shot public goods without any extrinsic incentive to do so.…”
Section: The Determinants Of Social Order I: Internalized Normsmentioning
confidence: 99%