Social Networks and Religious Violence

Abstract

The causes of religious violence have attracted numerous explanations in the years since the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers. However, most forms of religious extremism do not result in violence (e.g., the Amish, Hasidim, Jains) and religious groups have not cornered the market on egregious violence. Nevertheless, religious violence does occur, and this paper examines the interplay of social networks and religious violence. It builds on Cass Sunstein's “law of group polarization,” which predicts that when like-minded people deliberate as an organized group, the general opinion shifts toward extreme versions of their common belief. It argues that internally dense religious groups that maintain few ties to the wider society are more likely to embrace extreme views and behavior than are those that are not as dense and/or remain tied to the wider society. The argument is then tested using social network analysis methodologies to examine the evolution of the Hamburg Cell, which played a critical role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations that can limit but not eliminate religious extremism and violent behavior in the future.

Religious motifs within reporting of the 7/7 London bombings in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Poland: A transnational agenda-setting network study

“…In conclusion, the approach adopted in this article has helped to provide a wider view on the reporting of the 7/7 bombings that includes insights into connections between its coverage and religion (Everton, 2016). It takes a place among the growing number of studies that have used the NAS model to analyze media and political issues (Guo and McCombs, 2016).…”

Fascist aspirants: Fascist Forge and ideological learning in the extreme-right online milieu

“…Many studies on extremist and terrorist transmission conceptualise learning as a process undertaken by individuals (e.g. Hundeide, 2003;Pearson, 2015;Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011), with some narrowing the focus to specific types of people, for example, children who fall into the hands of militant groups (Horgan et al, 2017;Hundeide, 2003), novices who join ideological cells or networks (Everton, 2016;Kenney, 2017Kenney, , 2018Wali, 2017), or those who seek to identify with or model themselves on radical exemplars (Crone, 2016;Körner & Staller, 2018). Other studies have looked at learning from the perspective of groups, for example, with a focus on how recruits or converts acquire new knowledge and skills (Galonnier & de los Rios, 2016;Inge, 2016;Wiktorowicz, 2005), how charismatic leaders transmit their teachings to followers (Beekers, 2015;Gendron, 2017;Wali, 2017), or how groups learn from one another (Morrison, 2017;Ranstorp & Normark, 2015).…”

“…One study suggests that terrorist learning occurs across diverse interdependent agents, including individuals, groups, and entire generations (Kettle & Mumford, 2017). Others focus more explicitly on intergenerational learning, for example, how children acquire religious or political beliefs and practices from older family members (Copeland, 2019;Horgan et al, 2017;Lee & Knott, 2016;Scourfield et al, 2013), or on intragenerational peer transmission and skill development (Everton, 2016;Lee & Knott, 2017;Maher, 2014).…”

Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging

“…Everton's analysis of the 11 September 2001 attackers, the so-called Hamburg cell, for example, uses the concept of sociocultural tension as a factor in network closure: the hiving off of extreme clusters of actors in networks into their own echo chambers. 78 Countermessaging risks exacerbating and increasing the sense of isolation for those already engaging with extreme groups. While the intention to "de-cool" extreme groups may be viable for those who have not yet engaged, for others that already identify with extreme groups, or who are already actively involved, then ridicule will likely do little to persuade them to desist.…”