Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?

Paternotte, Cédric; Grose, Jonathan

doi:10.1093/bjps/axs024

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…That would be a piece of erroneous thinking according to the logic of the game but it can occur. Now the common way to test this is to compare how the same people perform under the condition of repeated play with how they 2 Other philosophical work that also discusses this and/or similar material is [5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. Bicchieri's (2006) book [5] is influential but in Section 3 I argue that it is ultimately on the wrong track.…”

Section: The One-shot Game Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity

Boer

2017

Games

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This paper is a partial review of the literature on 'social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a figure, to discuss a range of empirical studies. Where appropriate, I also briefly discuss a couple of insights from the (mostly parallel) evolutionary literature about cooperation. A concrete case of the Orma in Kenya will be used as a motivating example in the beginning.

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Section: The One-shot Game Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…10 [1] p. 48, 49. back the controls. 11 A script delivers a freeze-frame image of the other players in a game. The others are actually envisioned as states of nature, not as rational agents.…”

Section: Social Preferences Expectations and Scriptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity

Boer

2017

Games

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“…The typical case of harmony [7,13], which is relative to prisoner's dilemma, is deadlock, whose payoff matrix is show as Table 8. Then, for each player, what we know is shown as below: A) If the other side cooperates with me, I will choose cooperation to minimize my loss, so I will choose cooperation.…”

Section: Harmonymentioning

confidence: 99%

An Automatic Simulation Framework to Find Loopholes in Regimes

Wu¹

2017

IJPE

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Loopholes exist in nearly every regime, which leads to invalidity and instability in the running process of a regime. In this paper, we propose a new framework based on agent method and game theory to find loopholes in a regime, which contains two players with their clear payoffs. Following the principle of "winners stay, losers change", agents make their own choices among strategies, and their choices can affect the payoffs of other players, resulting in a dynamic equilibrium that has obvious features in decision path, which can be easily found in the final figures after simulation. We further exploit typical cases, such as prisoner's dilemma, anti-coordination game, coordination game and harmony, of which the results have been mathematical proved, to illustrate the validity of our method. Finally, we make some regimes in this paper based on the classical case, "Boxed Pigs", and find the loopholes in these regimes. By utilizing the framework proposed in this paper, managers are able to detect possible problems in advance at the time when they make regimes, which helps reduce the loss of costs caused by management and improve team relations.

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“…In particular, the pairwise interaction game, as a simple metaphor of illustrating the social conflict between different behaviors, has attracted great interest [ 12 , 13 ]. Typical examples include prisoner’s dilemma game [ 14 – 16 ], snowdrift game [ 14 , 17 ], harmony game [ 18 , 19 ] and ultimate game [ 20 ]. The former three mainly focus on the origin of cooperation, while the remaining latter gives attention to fairness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Small Groups with Heterogeneous Preference on Behavioral Evolution in Population Evacuation

et al. 2015

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Up to now, there have been a great number of mechanisms to explain the individual behavior and population traits, which seem of particular significance in evolutionary biology and social behavior analysis. Among them, small groups and heterogeneity are two useful frameworks to the above issue. However, vast majority of existing works separately consider both scenarios, which is inconsistent with realistic cases in our life. Here we propose the evolutionary games of heterogeneous small groups (namely, different small groups possess different preferences to dilemma) to study the collective behavior in population evacuation. Importantly, players usually face completely different dilemmas inside and outside the small groups. By means of numerous computation simulations, it is unveiled that the ratio of players in one certain small group directly decides the final behavior of the whole population. Moreover, it can also be concluded that heterogeneous degree of preference for different small groups plays a key role in the behavior traits of the system, which may validate some realistic social observations. The proposed framework is thus universally applicable and may shed new light into the solution of social dilemmas.

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Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?

Cited by 22 publications

References 30 publications

Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity

Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity

An Automatic Simulation Framework to Find Loopholes in Regimes

Impact of Small Groups with Heterogeneous Preference on Behavioral Evolution in Population Evacuation

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