Social perception in negotiation

Knowledge and the Sequential Processes of Negotiation: A Markov Chain Analysis of Response-in-Kind

“…As argued earlier, this probably occurred because the distributive tactics represented a default and persistent approach to negotiation, based on a residual typical win-lose assumption regarding the task (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Thus, negotiators already possessed and had access to these tactics entering the experimental session and the presentation of distributive tactical descriptions merely reinforced strategies they might otherwise use.…”

“…Whether existing knowledge is cued or new knowledge is provided depends on the knowledge held by the individual negotiator. Previous research tells us that naive negotiators (almost as a default strategy) typically engage in distributive behaviors that divide resources (Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990), as they are motivated by the assumption that negotiation situations are zero-sum (i.e., win-lose) in nature (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). This suggests that naive negotiators have relevant knowledge about certain distributive tactics and perhaps less knowledge of certain integrative tactics.…”

“…Thus, while it is possible that subjects in the NTK held the knowledge provided to the TK subjects, previous research suggests this is probably not the case. As noted, naive negotiators tend to hold a zero-sum assumption (Thompson & Hastie, 1990) and primarily use distributive tactics by default .…”

Perspective taking as a means to overcome motivational barriers in negotiations: When putting oneself into the opponent's shoes helps to walk toward agreements.

“…This new negotiation paradigm parallels classical tasks (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975;Thompson & Hastie, 1990) in that issues, options, and divergence of preferences are altered (see Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993;Thompson, 2006). In addition, the paradigm allows for the variation not only of negotiators' preferences toward the issues but also of their underlying interests (cf.…”

“…However, this selfish motivation of negotiators can turn out to be a crucial motivation barrier on the way toward mutually satisfying outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Previous research indicates that negotiation outcomes may be deteriorated for two reasons: First, disputants may fail to detect integrative win-win solutions and settle instead on suboptimal compromises (e.g., Bazerman, Moore, & Gillespie, 1999;Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993;Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Second, disputants may end up with hurtful nonagreements on (part of) the issues, leaving valuable resources on the bargaining table Trötschel, Hüffmeier, & Loschelder, 2010).…”