Social positioning and Commons’s monetary theorising

Rights and obligations—sometimes referred to as deontology or deontic powers—are key to most contemporary conceptions of social ontology. Both Cambridge Social Ontology and the dominant analytic conception associated, most prominently, with John Searle, place rights and obligations at the centre of their accounts. Such a common emphasis has led some to consider deontology to be a point of similarity between these different theories. This is a mistake. In this paper, I show that a distinctive conception of rights and obligations underpins Cambridge Social Ontology and its social positioning theory. Moreover, I argue that a fuller understanding of the account of rights and obligations defended in Cambridge in fact reveals that it can be differentiated from other conceptions and, most importantly, Searle's, by its recognition that a practical dimension is always involved in social constitution.

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Rights and obligations in Cambridge social ontology

Slade-Caffarel

2022

“…Social positioning theory has recently received a good deal of attention and has been both deployed in various contexts and subjected to significant critical analysis and comparative assessment (Lawson, 2015(Lawson, , 2016a(Lawson, , 2016b(Lawson, , 2019(Lawson, , 2022a(Lawson, , 2022b(Lawson, , 2023Cardinale & Runde, 2021;Faulkner & Runde, 2019;Lawson & Morgan, 2021;Martins, 2022;Pratten, 2017Pratten, , 2020Pratten, , 2022Slade-Caffarel, 2022). However, there are aspects of the theory that currently remain only partially elaborated and warrant a more systematic treatment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Concept of Function in Social Positioning Theory

Pratten

2023

Self Cite

The term function currently features prominently in outlines of social positioning theory but a sustained account of the view of function informing social positioning theory has yet to be supplied. In the absence of a fuller articulation of the theory's underlying view of function confusion and misinterpretation are likely to be encouraged especially among those committed to one or other of the numerous alternative accounts of function available. In this paper key features of the concept of function as it now appears in social positioning theory are identified and the similarities and differences between it and selected other views of function explored.

“…25 25 See for example Cardinale, Ivano and Jochen Runde 2021, Faulkner, Philip, and Jochen Runde 2013, 2019, Lawson Clive, 2017, Lawson Tony, 2007, 2012, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016a,b, 2018a,b, 2019c,b,c, 2022, 2023, Lawson Tony and Jamie Morgan 2021a,b, Lewis, Paul 2021, Martins, Nuno 2013, 2015, 2017,2022, 2023, Mensik, Josef 2022, Morgan, 2020, Pratten, Stephen 2017, 2018, 2020, 2022, Slade‐Caffarel, Yannick 2020, 2022. …”

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confidence: 99%

Social positioning theory and quantum mechanics

Lawson

2023

Social positioning theory, or an account of the human individual that it grounds, qualifies as a quantum social theory. This is an assessment that I explain and defend in the paper. It is of interest in that, in a world where increasing numbers are seeking to construct quantum social theories, it serves to help demonstrate that this goal can be achieved without giving up on meeting criteria like explanatory intelligibility or power or discarding real‐world notions like human (and other) entities. As it turns out, a central feature of the account defended and a core element of the ‘standard’ interpretation of quantum mechanics are found to stand in an interesting, unanticipated and suggestive relation to each other.