2020
DOI: 10.1093/jogss/ogz065
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Social Practices of Rule-Making for International Law in the Cyber Domain

Abstract: In 2013, despite deteriorating relations between Russia and the United States and increased global contention over cybersecurity issues, participating states in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly agreed on a landmark report endorsing the applicability of existing international law to state military use of information technology. Given these conditions, the timing of this agreement was surprising. In this article I argue that state representatives engaged in a rule-governed social practi… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The oewg on ict in International Security was established in 2018 and extended the discussions around state responsibility in cyberspace that were taking place up to then within the UN gge to the whole UN membership. There were multiple reasons for its establishment (see Raymond 2021), but soon after it started its work in 2019 it became clear that cyber-diplomacy had become a prerogative of a much broader number of states, and that the discussions around ict s in international security had become more global. The oewg (initially proposed to work for one year, later extended to two due to Covid-19-related travel restrictions) has subsequently approved a set of conclusions that reinforced the acquis of the previous gge s, including its non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.…”
Section: 13mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The oewg on ict in International Security was established in 2018 and extended the discussions around state responsibility in cyberspace that were taking place up to then within the UN gge to the whole UN membership. There were multiple reasons for its establishment (see Raymond 2021), but soon after it started its work in 2019 it became clear that cyber-diplomacy had become a prerogative of a much broader number of states, and that the discussions around ict s in international security had become more global. The oewg (initially proposed to work for one year, later extended to two due to Covid-19-related travel restrictions) has subsequently approved a set of conclusions that reinforced the acquis of the previous gge s, including its non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.…”
Section: 13mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, Chinese scholars have grasped the ambiguity of the concept to (re)interpret the public core, ‘moving the norm beyond its infrastructure security to a state security goal’ that is firmly embedded in the Chinese thinking on cyber sovereignty (Fung, 2022). Being able to agree on shared language when divisions between the main state powers are as deep as they currently are, is testimony to the strength of the UN process, as norms scholars such as Maurer (2020), Levinson (2021) and Raymond (2021) have underscored. However, even the shared language leaves ample room for contestation and interpretation of that language which many norms scholars increasingly see as the new normal of international diplomatic cyber negotiations (Kurowska, 2019; Wiener, 2014).…”
Section: Growing Recognition Of the Need To Protect Global Internet I...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…157.In 2017 the GGE failed to yield a consensus report. See Henriksen 2019; Maurer 2020; Raymond 2020; Tikk and Kerttunen 2018.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%