Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study

Loch, Christoph H.; Wu, Yaozhong

doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0910

Cited by 377 publications

(289 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Recent studies indicate that a social preference may influence behaviour in supply chain transactions. Loch and Wu (2008) have developed a game structure for a linear contract between a wholesale price, and order quantity and market price. Their results suggested that there are social preferences in business transactions.…”

Section: Procurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling and analysis of sustainable operations management: certain investigations for research and applications

Gunasekaran

Irani

Παπαδόπουλος

2014

Journal of the Operational Research Society

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Sustainable Operations Management (SOM) can be defined as the operations strategies, tactics and techniques, and operational policies to support both economic and environmental objectives and goals. The subject of sustainability has gained much attention from both researchers and practitioners in the past 6-8 years. Most of the articles deal with sustainability from environmental perspectives, but a limited number of them integrate both economic and environmental implications or focus on trading-off between profitability, competitiveness and environmental dimensions. Moreover, there is a limited focus on modelling and analysis of SOM integrating and balancing the interests of both economic and environmental interests. Therefore, an attempt has been made in this paper to review the extant literature on SOM. The objective is to understand the definition of SOM and present the current status of research in modelling and analysis, as well as future research directions in the field. Considering the recent focus of the subject, we review the literature on MA of SOM beginning in 2000 in order to make our study current and more relevant for both researchers and practitioners. Finally, a summary of findings and conclusions is reported.

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Section: Procurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling and analysis of sustainable operations management: certain investigations for research and applications

Gunasekaran

Irani

Παπαδόπουλος

2014

Journal of the Operational Research Society

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“…Loch and Wu (2008) use laboratory experiments with human subjects to show that profit comparisons Article submitted to ; manuscript no.…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Design of Social Comparison Effects: Setting Reference Groups and Reference Points

Roels

2013

SSRN Journal

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In this paper, we study how social planners should exploit social comparisons to pursue their objectives. We consider two modes of social comparison, referred to as behind-averse and ahead-seeking behaviors, depending on whether individuals experience a utility loss from underperforming or a utility gain from overperforming relative to their peers. Modeling social comparison as a game between players, we find that ahead-seeking behavior leads to output polarization, whereas behind-averse behavior leads to output clustering. A social planner can mitigate these effects in two ways: (i) by providing the full reference distribution of outputs instead of an aggregate reference point based on the average output and (ii) by assigning players into uniform rather than diverse reference groups. Social planners may thus need to tailor the reference structure to the predominant mode of social comparison and their objective. A performance-focused social planner may set the reference structure so as to maximize the output of either the top or the bottom player depending on whether she puts greater marginal weight to larger or smaller outputs. When the social planner also cares about utility, she faces a dilemma because performance optimization may not be aligned with utility maximization. Inevitably, the social planner will have to confront equity issues because better performance may not reflect greater effort or greater ability. Xuanming SuThe Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA, xuanming@wharton.upenn.edu In this paper, we study how social planners should exploit social comparisons to pursue their objectives.We consider two modes of social comparison, referred to as behind-averse and ahead-seeking behaviors, depending on whether individuals experience a utility loss from under-performing or a utility gain from overperforming relative to their peers. Modeling social comparison as a game between players, we find that aheadseeking behavior leads to output polarization whereas behind-averse behavior leads to output clustering.A social planner can mitigate these effects in two ways, (i) by providing the full reference distribution of outputs instead of an aggregate reference point based on the average output, and (ii) by assigning players into uniform rather than diverse reference groups. Social planners may thus need to tailor the reference structure to the predominant mode of social comparison and their objective. A performance-focused social planner may set the reference structure so as to maximize the output of either the top or the bottom player depending on whether she puts greater marginal weight to larger or smaller outputs. When the social planner also cares about utility, she faces a dilemma because performance-optimization may not be aligned with utility-maximization. Inevitably, the social planner will have to confront equity issues because better performance may not reflect greater effort or greater ability.

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“…In this paper, we characterize the agent's unfairness aversion preference based on the utility function proposed in literature [31]. Numerous scholars found that agents in a weak position, in addition to paying more attention to their own profits, are much willing to compare with other agents [2,32]. In China's project practice, compared to the owner, the contractor generally is in a weak position.…”

Section: Inequity Aversion Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the negotiation process about construction time compression, the distribution and comparison of benefits will trigger the perceptions of fairness between the owner and the contractor, which will have a significant impact on the negotiation process and results. In addition, many scholars found that the subjects who are in a weak position not only care about their own benefits but also compare their benefits to others [1,2]. In the construction practice of China, the contractor is in a weak position generally compared with the owner.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Complexity and Simulation of Revenue Sharing Negotiation Based on Construction Stakeholders

2018

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This paper focuses on the complexity characteristics of a stakeholder's revenue sharing for time compression in construction projects, such as adopting a life cycle perspective, the preferences of stakeholders, and the adaptability behaviors in the negotiation process. We build an agent-based model on revenue sharing negotiation. Considering that the agents who are in a weak position not only care about their own benefits but also compare their benefits to others, we design an experimental scenario where a contractor has fairness preference based on China's reality. According to different sympathy and envy coefficients, we can divide the inequity aversion preference into three typical types, and we research how a contractor's different types of inequity aversion preferences impact revenue sharing coefficient of agreements, results of successful negotiations, and efficiency in negotiations. Results are as follows: it is advantageous for a contractor to maintain a modest inequity aversion for their own earnings and the degree of sympathy preference in inequity aversion has an important impact on the time to reach consensus while the degree of jealousy preference has no obvious effect. If contractors' sympathy preference is maintained within a moderate range, it will achieve a higher success rate of negotiations in the negotiation process; the success rate of negotiation is affected largely by the agents' sympathy preference, though it is also influenced by the jealousy preference, but it is not very sensitive.

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Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study

Cited by 377 publications

References 39 publications

Modelling and analysis of sustainable operations management: certain investigations for research and applications

Modelling and analysis of sustainable operations management: certain investigations for research and applications

Optimal Design of Social Comparison Effects: Setting Reference Groups and Reference Points

The Complexity and Simulation of Revenue Sharing Negotiation Based on Construction Stakeholders

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