Social preferences, positive expectations, and trust based cooperation

Murphy, Ryan O.; Ackermann, Kurt A.

doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2015.06.001

Cited by 28 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…These results are corroborated by the additional analysis of comparisons between absolute differences in SVO scores across treatments at the individual level (see Table 3). 9 As mentioned above, the absolute difference in individual SVO scores between DGT and MGT is 12.49. This absolute difference is similar in magnitude to the absolute differences in SVO scores between RCT and RUT on one side, and MGT on the other side (13.54 and 12.14, respectively).…”

Section: Rctmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…In a proper game, the DM's final payoff is not a result of her choices alone, but rather the result of her decisions in combination with the decisions made by a mutually interdependent other person. In such situations of strategic interdependence, i.e., games, people's choices are supposed to be a function of both their distributional preferences and their beliefs about the other person's behavior (e.g., [7][8][9]). As decision making tasks are fundamentally different from strategic interactions in terms of the degree of interdependence, we refer to decision making tasks and strategic interactions as strictly different situations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We used a standard non-metric MDS-algorithm based on Kruskal's normalized STRESS1 criterion (see [50]). 9 We also applied yet another method to analyze the data concerning Hypothesis 2. Concretely, in addition to comparing absolute differences in SVO scores across treatments, we also compared aggregated deviations in the options that were chosen in the single items of the choice tasks across treatments.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Playing a Game or Making a Decision? Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

Greiff

Ackermann

Murphy

2018

Games

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In terms of role assignment and informational characteristics, different contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and systemically vary role assignment as well as the way information is displayed to subjects when measuring distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks as well as proper games. Specifically we examine choice behavior in the contexts of role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that there is large heterogeneity in the choices people make when deciding how to allocate resources between themselves and some other person under different contextual frames. For instance, people make more prosocial choices under role uncertainty as compared to role certainty. Furthermore, altering the way information is displayed given a particular situation can have a more dramatic effect on choice behavior than altering the situation itself. That is, depending on how information is displayed, people may behave as if they would perform a non-strategic decision making task when in fact they are playing a proper game characterized by strategic interdependence.

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Section: Rctmentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Playing a Game or Making a Decision? Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

Greiff

Ackermann

Murphy

2018

Games

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“…In other words, under the assumption of narrow self-interest and common knowledge thereof, altering game parameters such as the K-index in a PD or the MPCR in a PGG will have no effect at all on the DMs' behavior in a social dilemma. Only if DMs are assumed to derive benefit not exclusively from their own payoff, but at least in part also from the payoffs others receive (i.e., if DMs have non-selfish distributive social preferences), altering game parameters can be expected to affect behavior (see, e.g., [36,37]).…”

Section: On the Importance Of Considering Endogenous Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Public Goods Games: How Preferences and Beliefs Affect Contribution Levels

Ackermann

Murphy

2019

Games

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There is a large body of evidence showing that a substantial proportion of people cooperate in public goods games, even if the situation is one-shot and completely anonymous. In the present study, we bring together two major endogenous factors that are known to affect cooperation levels, and in so doing replicate and extend previous empirical research on public goods problems in several important ways. We measure social preferences and concurrently elicit beliefs on the individual level using multiple methods, and at multiple times during the experiment. With this rich set of predictor variables at the individual level, we test how well individual contribution decisions can be accounted for in both a one-shot and a repeated interaction. We show that when heterogeneity in people’s preferences and beliefs is taken into consideration, more than 50% of the variance in individual choice behavior can be explained. Furthermore, we show that people do not only update their beliefs in a repeated public goods game, but also that their social preferences change, to some extent, in response to the choices of other decision makers.

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“…Second, institutional trust refers to households' trust towards the leaders of the village committee/WUA and policy. On the one hand, households would have a positive psychological expectation of the water user group if they trusted the leaders [65,66]. This would help to form an informal risk reduction system and enhance household confidence in irrigation management.…”

Section: Estimation Results: Social Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating the Effects of Social Trust and Perceived Organizational Support on Irrigation Management Performance in Rural China

Liu

Rezitis

Zhu

et al. 2018

Water

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Understanding the factors affecting irrigation management performance is crucial for sustainable resource use, especially with the decentralized management mode of irrigation systems being implemented in rural China. This paper contributes to the research field by incorporating different categories of social trust and perceived organization support (POS) into the analysis of irrigation management performance, by linking multiple elements that are based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. We employed principal component analysis (PCA) and ordered probit regression to analyze a database covering 785 households in the upstream of the Yellow River basin. The results suggested that social trust and POS positively affected the irrigation management performance, and social trust strengthened the positive effect of POS on the performance. Furthermore, the results indicated that personal trust and institutional trust, as well as perceived emotional support and physical support, positively affected the performance. In addition, we also found that household characteristics, household cognition, group characteristics, physical conditions, and rules-in-use also had significant impact on the performance. This paper can be used to inform the government that social trust and POS need to be considered in the common-pool resources (CPRs) management.

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Social preferences, positive expectations, and trust based cooperation

Cited by 28 publications

References 13 publications

Playing a Game or Making a Decision? Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

Playing a Game or Making a Decision? Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Distributional Preferences

Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Public Goods Games: How Preferences and Beliefs Affect Contribution Levels

Investigating the Effects of Social Trust and Perceived Organizational Support on Irrigation Management Performance in Rural China

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