Social price-sensitivity of demand for competitive supply chain coordination

Seyedhosseini, Seyed Mohammad; Hosseini‐Motlagh, Seyyed‐Mahdi; Johari, Maryam; Jazinaninejad, Mona

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2019.05.019

Cited by 67 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Another work surveyed the effects of manufacturer's social responsibility investment [32]. The proposed model contains two retailers and a manufacturer for a competitive supply chain and solved using backward induction method.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impact of Adopting Quick Response and Agility on Supply Chain Competition with Strategic Customer Behavior

2020

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A growing trend towards computerization and competition in supply chains results in uncertainty and quick variability that make the decisions difficult for both levels of retailers and manufacturers. In this paper, two Bi-Level Stackelberg models are developed under nonand agile conditions in the presence of strategic customers. Our main novelty approach in this paper is to consider both levels competing with each other in a sequential game to determine the optimal production and order quantities and prices with and without agile abilities. In addition, both proposed models are simplified single-level using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) approach. Then, they are remodeled by a Robust Optimization technique due to existing uncertain parameters. To have a better assessment of the models' efficiency and applicability, they have been implemented in a real case and finally, the results are compared and analyzed.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Constraints (27 and 28) ensure that the retail price cannot exceed a certain limit since customers do not be disposed to incur extra expenses. The ordering capacity and available budget for the follower are limited by constraints (29)(30)(31)(32). And finally, the constraint (33) shows the positive variables.…”

Section: mentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Adopting Quick Response and Agility on Supply Chain Competition with Strategic Customer Behavior

2020

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“…In the followers group, we deal with three types of competition behavior: Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg. When engaging in Collusion behavior, the recyclers cooperatively decide on their selling prices, while their selling prices are set competitively when displaying Cournot behavior [50]. When using Stackelberg behavior, the leader of the two recyclers initially sets the price, after which the follower determines its own price based on the leader's price.…”

Section: Decision-making Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

Lee

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

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“…is section designs multiple two-part tariff contracts as incentive schemes to promote SC members to make the globally optimal decisions. In each proposed two-part tariff contract, the upstream manufacturer first chooses the wholesale price for the green products and then charges a franchise fee f i to downstream retailer i (i � 1, 2), respectively [18]. e SC members' decision variables and profit in the coordination scenario are denoted by superscript, co, with regard to different power relationships l, l ∈ M 0 (R…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the M 0 R 1 R 2 , R 1 R 2 M 0 , and VS models, the incentive constraint f l i ≤ Π co/l i − Π l i still holds, but we cannot derive each retailer's lower bound of franchise fee (f l i ) from the equation f l i ≥ (1/2)(Π l 0 − Π co/l 0 ). According to [18], the lower bound of franchise fee from the view point of the manufacturer can be determined based on the retailer i's share of cost coefficient of the manufacturer's greening improvement, which can be shown as follows:…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

Wang

Liu

Zhang

et al. 2019

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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e main objective of this research is to examine the role of power relationship in a two-level green supply chain which is made up of one shared manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We develop six game theory-based models to explore the members' operational decisions in a supply chain taking into account three vertical power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) as well as two retailers' horizontal power structure (Bertrand or Stackelberg competition). en, we design a two-part tariff contract which can encourage the supply chain members to promote cooperation and eventually coordinate the decentralized green supply chain under each power structure. Lastly, to further discuss the impact of the green awareness of consumers and the greening cost on supply chain players' operational decisions and profits, we employ some numerical examples to conduct sensitivity analysis. e main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the impact of power structure on the supply chain players' operational decisions and profits mainly depends on the substitutability of the green products, the green awareness of consumers, and the greening cost for the manufacturer. Secondly, the more power the manufacturer has, the lower product greenness will be set. irdly, the consumer's environmental awareness (the greening cost) positively (negatively) influences the manufacturer's product greenness and wholesale price, the retailers' sales prices, and the player's profits under each power structure. Finally, the developed two-part tariff contract is practicable and beneficial for both the manufacturer and the two retailers.

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Social price-sensitivity of demand for competitive supply chain coordination

Cited by 67 publications

References 59 publications

Impact of Adopting Quick Response and Agility on Supply Chain Competition with Strategic Customer Behavior

Impact of Adopting Quick Response and Agility on Supply Chain Competition with Strategic Customer Behavior

Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

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