Social responsibility in tobacco production? Tobacco companies' use of green supply chains to obscure the real costs of tobacco farming

Abstract

Background Tobacco companies have come under increased criticism because of environmental and labor practices related to growing tobacco in developing countries. Methods Analysis of tobacco industry documents, industry web sites and interviews with tobacco farmers in Tanzania and tobacco farm workers, farm authorities, trade unionists, government officials and corporate executives from global tobacco leaf companies in Malawi. Results British American Tobacco and Philip Morris created supply chains in the 1990s to improve production efficiency, control, access to markets, and profits. In the 2000s, the companies used their supply chains in an attempt to legitimize their portrayals of tobacco farming as socially and environmentally friendly, rather than take meaningful steps to eliminate child labor and reduce deforestation in developing countries. The tobacco companies used nominal self-evaluation (not truly independent evaluators) and public relations to create the impression of social responsibility. The companies benefit from $1.2 billion in unpaid labor costs due to child labor and more than $64 million annually in costs that would have been made to avoid tobacco related deforestation in the top twelve tobacco growing developing countries, far exceeding the money they spend nominally working to change these practices. Conclusions The tobacco industry uses green supply chains to make tobacco farming in developing countries appear sustainable while continuing to purchase leaf produced with child labor and high rates of deforestation. Strategies to counter green supply chain schemes include securing implementing protocols for the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control to regulate the companies’ practices at the farm level.

Moving past the problematisation of tobacco farming: insights from South India

“…Thus research that suggests that tobacco farmers are pauperised by low prices under contract farming18 or that tobacco engenders high social and environmental costs17 does so without a clear overview of other comparable crop value chains in specific regions. The implicit suggestion that tobacco alone causes such issues (although potentially accurate) is often under-evidenced.…”

Shared vision, shared vulnerability: A content analysis of corporate social responsibility information on tobacco industry websites

“…(Research has shown that tobacco company efforts to “green” their supply chains started in the 2000s.) 27 These seven companies all mentioned their support for or promotion of sustainable agricultural practices among farmers (e.g., crop rotation, soil mulching, water conservation, and pesticide minimization). RAI was the only company to put a dollar figure to this support, noting that its subsidiary, Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company, had provided over $190,000 to the Carolina Farm Stewardship Program to “promote sustainable farming.” All of the multinational tobacco companies and one US company (PM USA) also discussed their financial support for reforestation programs that replaced trees cut down and used for fuel in curing tobacco leaves.…”

The importance of continued engagement during the implementation phase of tobacco control policies in a middle-income country: the case of Costa Rica

“…This strategy has been used in high [97][98][99] and lower and middle income 68 100 101 countries to avoid stricter regulations on smoking in public places, 10 14 17 102 tobacco advertising, 9 17 102 103 health warning labels 17 104 and tobacco farming and labour practices. [105][106][107] The earmarked tobacco taxes for tobacco control programmes provided much needed financial assistance to combat industry opposition and effectively promote, monitor, enforce and create awareness about smoke-free environments and TAPS restrictions. The Health Ministry consistently made inspections at restaurants and bars even at night time to enforce the law, which are important challenges in LMICs, 67 101 even in places with high-level compliance.…”