Social security and retirement incentives in Austria

Hofer, Helmut; Koman, Reinhard

doi:10.1007/s10663-006-9018-8

Cited by 34 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Since then, it has increased slightly to around 59 years since 2005. Despite the different statutory retirement age for men and women, the actual retirement age for women is less than half a year lower than the one for males (Hofer and Koman, 2006). Early retirement due to reduced working capacity was possible in the 1990s for men and women after age 55.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Too old to work, too young to retire?

Ichino

Schwerdt

Winter‐Ebmer

et al. 2017

The Journal of the Economics of Ageing

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We study whether employment prospects of old and young workers differ after a plant closure. Using Austrian administrative data, we show that old and young workers face similar displacement costs in terms of employment in the long-run, but old workers lose considerably more initially and gain later. We interpret these findings using a search model with retirement as an absorbing state, that we calibrate to match the observed patterns. Our finding is that the dynamics of relative employment losses of old versus young workers after a displacement are mainly explained by different opportunities of transition into retirement. In contrast, differences in layoff rates and job offer arrival rates cannot explain these patterns. Our results support the idea that retirement incentives, more than weak labor demand, are responsible for the low employment rates of older workers. JEL-Code: J14, J65.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the case of the normal old-age pension at the statutory retirement age, the best 5-15 years of earnings (below a certain upper contribution cap) are used to calculate the basis of assessment (Hofer and Koman, 2006). In the eighties the five best years of earnings were used only, which was later on extended.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Too old to work, too young to retire?

Ichino

Schwerdt

Winter‐Ebmer

et al. 2017

The Journal of the Economics of Ageing

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“…both our control and treatment group, see below) in the same way and thus need not be taken explicitly into account. See Hofer and Koman (2006) for details.…”

Section: Pathways To Retirement In Austria 21 the Retirement Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fatal Attraction? Access to Early Retirement and Mortality

2010

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe estimate the causal effect of early retirement on mortality for blue-collar workers. To overcome the problem of endogenous selection, we exploit an exogenous change in unemployment insurance rules in Austria that allowed workers in eligible regions to withdraw from the workforce up to 3.5 years earlier than those in non-eligible regions. For males, instrumental-variable estimates show a significant 2.4 percentage points (about 13%) increase in the probability of dying before age 67. We do not find any adverse effect of early retirement on mortality for females. Death causes indicate a significantly higher incidence of cardiovascular disorders among eligible workers, suggesting that changes in health-related behavior explain increased mortality among male early retirees.JEL classification: I1, J14, J26

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“…This is the relevant case under Austrian disability and old-age pension rules (Hofer and Koman, 2006). Proposition 1.…”

Section: Modeling the Early Retirement Decisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extended Unemployment Benefits and Early Retirement: Program Complementarity and Program Substitution

Inderbitzin

Staubli

Zweimüller

2016

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper explores how extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefits targeted to older workers affect early retirement and social welfare. The trade-off of optimal UI between consumption smoothing and moral hazard requires accounting for the entire early retirement system, which often includes extended UI and relaxed access to disability insurance (DI). We argue that extended UI generates program complementarity (increased take-up of UI followed by DI and/or regular retirement benefits) and program substitution (increased take-up of UI instead of DI). Exploiting Austria's regional extended benefit program, which extended regular UI benefits to up to 4 years, we find: (i) program complementarity is quantitatively important for workers aged 50+; and (ii) program substitution is quantitatively relevant for workers aged 55+. We derive a simple rule for optimal UI that accounts for program complementarity and program substitution. Using the sufficient statistics approach, we conclude that UI for older workers was too generous and the regional extended benefit program was a suboptimal policy. Terms of use: Documents in

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Social security and retirement incentives in Austria

Abstract: Public pensions, Retirement incentives, Social security wealth, H55, J22, J26,

Cited by 34 publications

References 18 publications

Too old to work, too young to retire?

Too old to work, too young to retire?

Fatal Attraction? Access to Early Retirement and Mortality

Extended Unemployment Benefits and Early Retirement: Program Complementarity and Program Substitution

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