Social structure and debates on fisheries management in the Atlantic surf clam fishery

The equity debate: distributional impacts of individual transferable quotas

“…The tension between small-scale harvesters and larger-scale harvesters and processors has been a recurrent theme in fisheries management and was a volatile issue in the clam fishery [19,20]. This paper uses 17 years of input and output data as well as firm identifiers to determine whether the implementation of ITQs favored one type of firm (independent, fleet, or vertically integrated) over another, as reflected in industry composition.…”

“…A firm not owned by a processor was then further classified by the number of vessels it owned while it was harvesting clams: independent firms own less than three vessels and fleet firms own more than two vessels. This delineation was used to reflect the dominant social stratification in the fishery [20].…”

“…Debate over property rights in the clam fishery spanned a decade, and a central concern was that independents would be disadvantaged in their allocation [20,23]. Amendment Eight: Fishery Management Plan for the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery, finalized the allocation formula [24].…”

The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned?

“…Though this has not necessarily lowered incomes, it has changed the culture of fishing. (McCay, Gatewood et al 1989;McCay and Creed 1990) Processors can be affected by the introduction of ITQs in a number of ways. First the processing sector is typically as overcapitalized as the harvesting sector.…”

“…Though this transformation can result in higher incomes for crew (Knapp 1997), the change in status has been difficult to accept for those used to be co-venturers sharing in both the risk and reward of fishing. (McCay, Gatewood et al 1989;McCay and Creed 1990) Processors have also staked their claim for quota (especially in Alaska), albeit unsuccessfully to date. (Matulich, Mittelhammer et al 1996) The claims are based upon the immobility of the processing capital and the fact that allocating quota to boat owners changes the bargaining relationship in ways that could hurt processors.…”