Social value orientation and regulatory compliance in Ugandan public procurement

Abstract

The public procurement and disposal of Assets Act (PPDA Act 2003), provides the institutional framework under which public procurement in Uganda is undertaken. The PPDA Act requires all Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs) to ensure the application of fair, competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and value for money procurement and disposal standards and practices. The Act further creates and mandates the Ugandan Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) to monitor, administer and enforce compliance with the procurement law, regulations and guidelines [Section 7[r] of the PPDA Act 2003 Regulation 6 (e), (i), (ii), (iii) of the PPDA Regulations 2003]. Despite this provision, since 2005, Ugandan procurement audit reports have consistently reported failure by the PDEs to comply with the procurement law. Procurement personnel continue to complain about the cumbersome and lengthy, unfair procurement procedures. They assert that their procurement and disposal units (PDUs) have been downgraded to the level where they are regarded as mere secretariat to the contracts and evaluation committees with little power to make procurement related decisions. Although logically defensible, many procurement personnel detest the decision to legislate the procurement profession (Ntayi et al., 2010). Additionally, there is a general feeling that the PPDA is impartial and morally indefensible and ineffective. The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions and effects of social value orientation, expected utility, fairness in procurement procedures, the legitimacy of the procurement law and the procurement law enforcement authority on compliance with the procurement law, guidelines, procedures and regulations. Empirical research in this area is relatively sparse. Data were collected from a sample of 110 procurement and Disposing Entities (PDEs) and analysed using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Results of the fit indices between the model and the observed data were generally good for both CFA and SEM. Results reveal that social value orientation, expected utility, legitimacy of the procurement law enforcement agency and perceptions of procedural justice were significant predictors of PPDA regulatory agency. Findings have both policy and managerial implications for key public procurement stakeholders which we present.

Internal audit quality, punitive measures and accountability in Ugandan statutory corporations

“…The results show that punishment is important in achieving financial accountability confirming institutional and deterrence theory. The findings are consistent with the works of Nakyeyune et al (2016), Nkundabanyanga et al (2019), Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013) and Ntayi et al (2012). Punitive measures such as imprisonment, fines and loss of office force public officers that follow when public officers do not account, compel many officers to account for public resources.…”

“…A further study in Uganda by Nkundabanyanga et al (2019) too showed that deterrence mechanisms predict public regulatory compliance in government agencies in Uganda. Furthermore, the findings of Ntayi et al (2012) indicated that public procurement regulatory compliance in Uganda was explained by factors such as fear of being caught, the fear of getting punished and the fear of "losing face". The findings further show that a public procurement officer who sees a non-compliant colleague getting away unpunished will also be involved in the same act the next time.…”

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“…The independent variable is the entrepreneurial mindset that we operationalised as deliberative mindset, implemental mindset, and compulsive mindset (Gollwitzer, 1990;Mathisen and Arnulf, 2014). The measurement items were adapted from the review of the literature and anchored on six-point scales to avoid response indecision associated with middle neutral points (Ntayi et al, 2012) (Table 1).…”

Institutional pressures and procurement cycle time in Uganda’s central government procuring and disposing entities: the mediating role of opportunistic behavior

“…Opportunistic behavior entails achieving individual gains through dishonesty in transactions, and it manifests in form of contract renegotiation, distortion of information, breach of contract, lying, stealing, cheating, disguise and making false promises (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985). Most Ugandan civil servants are preoccupied with self-interest when carrying out public duties (Mbago et al , 2016; Ntayi et al , 2012) and will act optimistically, hence award of contract to incompetent firms that cannot execute work within the timeframe (Cloninger, 1995).…”