Association attacks aim to manipulate WiFi clients into associating with a malicious access point, by exploiting protocol vulnerabilities and usability features implemented on the network managers of modern operating systems. In this paper we classify association attacks based on the network manager features that each attack exploits. To validate their current validity status, we implement and test all known association attacks against the network managers of popular operating systems, by using our Wifiphisher tool. We analyze various strategies that may be implemented by an adversary in order to increase the success rate of association attacks. Furthermore, we examine the behavior of association attacks against upcoming security protocols and certifications for IEEE 802.11, such as WPA3, Wi-Fi Enhanced Open and Easy Connect. Our results show that even though the network managers have hampered the effectiveness of some known attacks (e.g. KARMA), other techniques (e.g. Known Beacons) are still active threats. More importantly, our results show that even the newer security protocols leave room for association attacks. Finally, we describe novel detection and prevention techniques for association attacks, as well as security controls based on user awareness.