“…However, the WEIRD notion of a person as a self-contained and value-free moral agent in control of his fate and intentional actions appears alien to African Psychology and the ontology of communalism in which a person is not, and cannot be, separated from others and their surrounding social context. African philosophical, sociological, and psychological scholarship generally agree on the assumptions of the African worldview as primarily communal and normative based on specific values and meaning systems that guide the Africentric paradigm of knowledge and human functioning, mutatis mutandis (e.g., Adjei, 2017b; Assimeng, 1999; Gyekye, 1996; Ikuenobe, 2006; Mbiti, 1989; Nwoye, 2015; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). This article discusses the social intentionality of personhood, agency, and morality from an African perspective and identifies their implications for psychological theorisation.…”