Socioeconomic benefits and limited parent–offspring disagreement in arranged marriages in Nepal

Abstract

Mate preferences probably evolved to increase fitness; however, studies using arranged and non-arranged marriage as proxies for limited and free mate choice (respectively) do not find any reproductive differences. We explore why arranged and non-arranged marriages are an imperfect proxy for limited and free-choice matings and what fitness effects different marriage types could produce. Data from focus group discussions with men and women in Nepal show that there are three spouse choice categories with differing levels of parental influence over mate choice, reinforcing that arranged and non-arranged are not dichotomous. Discussions also show that parents and offspring, especially sons, may be more aligned in in-law/mate preferences than expected, demonstrating the need to establish clear domains of parent–offspring disagreement over spouse choice in the community before investigating fitness. Several social and financial benefits that are only available to arranged couples in this community were detected, and these benefits could compensate for any costs of not choosing a spouse independently. These benefits of arranged marriage are more salient for women than for men. These discussions indicate that predictions about the effects of spouse choice on fitness outcomes may differ for men and women and depend on community-specific socioeconomic benefits.

Arranged and non-arranged marriages have similar reproductive outcomes in Nepal

“…However, these prior studies do not guarantee that parent–offspring disagreement exists in every context, and any society with low parent–offspring disagreement might not show the expected fitness differentials. Based on the available descriptive data, there is low parent–offspring disagreement in this population, as has been expressed in focus group discussions in other Nepali contexts 33 . This offers one potential explanation why fitness does not differ between those whose parents choose their spouse and those who choose their own spouse.…”

“…This could simply be due to low-resolution measurement of individual input on spouse choice since these studies distinguish arranged and non-arranged marriages as dichotomous categories. In reality, parent and offspring choice does not always fall neatly into two discrete categories; for example, offspring may be asked to give final approval over their parents’ choice even in arranged marriages 1 , 33 . Thus, the expected fitness differences may only emerge when spouse choice is parsed into more categories better representing the range of parent and offspring influence.…”

Gendered conflict in the human family

“…However, as several papers in this special collection make clear, assumptions about the inherent harms of these practices are commonly made with little reference to evidence, opening up much scope for ethnocentric bias (see also Lawson & Gibson, in press). In cases such as child marriage (Baraka et al, 2022), bridewealth (Akurugu et al, 2022), arranged marriage (Agey et al, 2023), and polygynous marriage (Anderson & Bidner, 2022;Lawson & Gibson, 2018;Pesando, 2021), careful analyses present a more nuanced picture of the wellbeing (and fitness) implications of each practice. For example, some studies show that polygynous marriage is predictive of relatively poor health for women and their children, implicating resource competition and co-wife conflict (Omariba & Boyle, 2007;Strassmann, 2011), while others highlight apparent benefits for women, including greater access to male owned-wealth and https://doi.org/10.1017/ehs.2023.8 Published online by Cambridge University Press associated benefits of greater livelihood resilience which benefits all family members (Dessy et al, 2021;Lawson et al, 2015).…”

“…Dhading, Nepal Agey et al (2023) Parents and daughters more often disagree than parents and sons over desired qualities in prospective marriage partners.…”

“…Given the absence of similar redistributive mechanisms in patrilineal groups, they speculate that wealth differences will become relatively more apparent with greater economic development. Schaffnit et al (2023) and Agey et al (2023) address the influence of market integration on patterns of arranged marriage, a site of both potential parent-offspring conflict and gendered conflict (as arranged marriage more often involves coercion of wives and daughters than husbands and sons). Drawing on data from Bangladesh, Schaffnit et al (2023) find that contrary to their expectations, markers of family market integration do not predict whether women enter an arranged or love marriage.…”