Socioeconomic Impact of Emerging Mobility Markets and Implementation Strategies

Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios; Malikopoulos, Andreas A.

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-06780-8_17

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…To understand the innate competition over the scarce resources in transportation and the impact of congestion, pricing game theory has been one of the standard tools that can help us investigate the impact of selfishness and traffic efficiency [27,28]. By adopting a game-theoretic approach, advanced systems have been proposed to assign travelers concrete routes or minimize all travelers' travel time while studying the system's Nash equilibrium (NE) under different mechanisms of congestion pricing [29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37]. Key theoretical games used for this approach include routing/congestion games [14,[38][39][40][41], which are a generalization of the standard resource-sharing game of an arbitrary number of resources in a network with a finite number of travelers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory

Chremos

Malikopoulos

2023

PLoS ONE

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In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a “mobility game” with coupled action sets. We formulate an atomic routing game to focus on the travelers’ preferences and study the impact on the efficiency of the travelers’ behavioral decision-making under rationality and prospect theory. To control the innate inefficiencies, we introduce a mobility “pricing mechanism,” in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at different transport hubs. We show that the travelers’ selfish actions lead to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We then perform a Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability analysis to establish that the mobility system’s inefficiencies remain relatively low and the social welfare at a NE remains close to the social optimum as the number of travelers increases. We deviate from the standard game-theoretic analysis of decision-making by extending our mobility game to capture the subjective behavior of travelers using prospect theory. Finally, we provide a detailed discussion of implementing our proposed mobility game.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…where J Nash e and J * e denote the number of services on road e at a NE and social optimum, respectively. Inspired from [70], we impose an upper bound on each component of the RHS of (35),…”

Section: Theorem 2 Any Inefficiencies Of Any Ne Of the Mobility Game ...mentioning

confidence: 99%