Sociology and Neoliberalism: A Missing History

Abstract

This paper argues that neoliberal thought initially positioned itself in relation to classical sociology by developing an economic epistemology in response, on one hand, to Max Weber's methodological writings, and, on the other, to the positivist sociology of figures such as Auguste Comte. These points of contact between early sociological and neoliberalism are addressed in detail in order to consider the challenges that the latter poses to sociological thought. It is argued that because the neoliberal project developed out an epistemological and political critique of classical ideas of the 'social', this places sociology in a position of strength to advance a critical response to the intellectual basis of neoliberalism.

A critical reading of the European Union’s social innovation policy discourse: (Re)legitimizing neoliberalism

“…Thus, it is important to note that there are significant differences between EUSIP discourse and general characterizations of 'hardcore' (e.g., Chicago School) neoliberalism. Notably, EUSIP discourse is clearly not aligned with neoliberal characteristics such as: (1) the rejection of altruism (see Gane, 2014a); (2) the notion that economic agents should not and cannot pursue the collective good (Foucault, 2008(Foucault, [1978: 179-183); or (3) an explicit war on the poor (Mirowski, 2013: 129-138). Post-print version Organization, 2017, Vol.…”

“…However, it fundamentally differs from both, from the former because despite its anti-state rhetorics neoliberalism gives a very important role to the state in contributing to construct markets in certain ways (Brown, 2003;Lemke, 2001;Peck, 2010), and from the latter because it is a political project (Brown, 2006;Harvey, 2005) which draws more on Austrian economics (Gane, 2014b;Mirowski, 2013). Critics of neoliberalism have focused on different aspects, from the activation and responsibilization of enterprising neoliberal subjects (notably Foucault, 2007Foucault, [1977[1978; and following his lead, Dean, 1999;Lemke, 2001;Munro, 2012;Rose, 1999) to the shaping of the neoliberal political project by and for the super-rich at the expense of the majority of the population (e.g., Harvey, 2005;Klein, 2007), through a number of studies of the historical intellectual development of neoliberalism (e.g., Gane, 2014a;2014b;Mirowski, 2013) and contributions emphasizing its impacts on politics and society (e.g., Davies, 2014;Peck, 2010). This rich, varied literature provides an excellent Post-print version Organization, 2017, Vol.…”

Social Solidarity and Herbert Spencer: Not the Oxymoron That Might Be Assumed

“…For Spencer himself illustrated what Elder-Vass has recently described as the social power of a "normative circle" in thinking about social structure. The members of such a circle form a structural entity at work in an area of social life which causes, in part, an outcome which the commitment to endorse and enforce practices with 20 Gane deals with Hayek's criticisms of Comte and Durkheim, but does not comment on how often Hayek, unawares, is echoing Spencer on spontaneous cooperation, and on altruism, which is not to be identified with "solidarity" in the sense of a holistic unitedness associated with Durkheim (Gane, 2014(Gane, , p. 1101 each other "makes a norm circle more effective than the sum of its members would be if they were not part of it" (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 123). Given that one of Spencer's concerns is with how governments, and everyday habits and fashions, could serve to channel the exercise of liberty in a myopic manner, he gives us a period gem of an instance in his Principles of Psychology: "Consider how difficult it would be to get a lady to wheel a costermonger's barrow down Regent-street, and how easily she may be led to say a malicious thing about some lady she is jealous of-contrast the intense repugnance to the one act, which is not in itself reprehensible, with the feeble repugnance to the other act, which is itself reprehensible; and then infer how great is the evolution of the moral sentiments yet required to bring human nature into complete fitness for the social state" (Spencer, 1881, p. ii:606).…”

In and out of neoliberalism: Reconsidering the sociology of Raymond Aron

“…Some have characterised Aron, as a consequence, as a political thinker (see, for example, Anderson, 1997), but such a characterisation misses the fact that Aron's differences with Hayek and with neoliberalism more generally were not simply political; they were also sociological. For whereas Hayek had little time for the social -that 'weasel word' (see Hayek, 1991) -and forcefully disassociated his own position from classical sociologists such as Auguste Comte (see Gane, 2014), Aron came back time and again to the social basis of liberalism, and drew extensively on the work of Comte and Saint-Simon to develop a framework for analysing the societal basis of different forms of industrialism. Aron did this because he was concerned not simply with the economic motivations of individual actors or with the dynamics and logic of the market, but with the operation of a range of different social institutions, many of which, he argued, can take a socialistic form even within capitalist society (see 1957b: 309).…”