Socrates Meets Thrasymachus

Thrasymachus in Plato’s Politeia I

“…(1995) 174-75. b) Justice is obedience to the laws: Hourani (1962); Anscombe (1963);c) Justice is another's good, one's own hurt: Kerferd (1947); Sparshott (1966); Henderson (1970); Nicholson (1974); Annas (1981) 46; Reeve (1985) 247; Chappell (1993); Scaltsas (1993). consistent position as historical fact, being that of the actual sophist, Thrasymachus; 20 others require from Plato nothing less than a consistent position to serve as decent opposition for the serious arguments presented by Socrates-Plato.…”

“…If his arguments fail to refute Thrasymachus, as I think they do, it is not because the disputants are arguing at cross-purposes, but rather because Socrates' arguments are defective." Reeve (1985) 263: "Plato doesn't tell us in so many words whether he thinks these Thrasymachean arguments are successful or not, but his subsequent practice in the Republic suggests that he thinks they are." 21 Annas (1981) 35 argues that creating a confused Thrasymachus would be a pointless procedure for Plato to follow, and continues (35-36): "It is clear from the beginning of Book 2 that Plato took Thrasymachus to be defending a theory which was a real and dangerous alternative to what he took to be the truth about justice.…”

Thrasymachus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 1

“…Thrasymachus' remarks are difficult to render entirely consistent. For discussion over how to construe Thrasymachus' definition (if it is a definition) of justice, see Kerferd 1947;Cross and Woozley 1964, 23-41;Nicholson 1974;Annas 1981;Reeve 1985;2008, 86-98;Boter 1986, Chappell 1993Irwin 1995, 174-5;Williams 1997;Barney 2006;Wedgwood 2017. To my mind, if we examine what these claims jointly amount to, it seems that Thrasymachus might mean that: (α) x acts justly iff there is a y such that y is stronger than (i.e.…”

“…For diachronic considerations (e.g. that the person becoming a tyrant is unjust, but is not unjust when he is a tyrant), seeReeve 1985, 254-9. 59 Cf.…”