Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions

Abstract

ÒSocratesÕ Pursuit of De nitionsÓ examines the manner in which Socrates pursues de nitions in PlatoÕs early de nitional dialogues and advances the following claims. Socrates evaluates de nitions (proposed by his interlocutors or himself) by considering their consistency with conditions of the identity of F (Fconditions) to which he is committed. In evaluating proposed de nitions, Socrates seeks to determine their truth-value. Socrates evaluates the truth-value of a proposed de nition by considering the consistency of the proposed de nition with F-conditions that F he believes to be true. (For instance, a proposed de nitionÕs inconsistency with one of these gives Socrates reason to believe that the de nition is false.) SocratesÕ belief in the truth of a given F-condition to which he is committed may be based on self-evidence, its endoxic status, experience, or deduction from premises to which he is committed on the basis of any of the previous three. However, Socrates does not consider the epistemological grounds of his commitments to his F-conditions. This is part of a general avoidance of metaethical and ethical epistemological issues. Due to his avoidance of these, SocratesÕ pursuit of true de nitions is theoretically na ve. However, Socrates recognizes a certain limitation to his manner of pursuing de nitions.These results are applied to advancing the following further points.(1) Although Socrates has a distinctive manner or style of pursuing de nitions, it is inappropriate to ascribe to him a method of doing so in the following sense. The concept of method implies a certain theoretical conception of procedure that Socrates lacks. Moreover, according to SocratesÕ own conceptual framework, only one who possessed the relevant t¡xnh would have a method. (2) Furthermore, SocratesÕ manner of pursuing de nitions is not elenctic just insofar as the word ÒelenchusÓ is interpreted to have adversarial connotations; that is inconsistent with SocratesÕ motives and interests. (3) SocratesÕ manner of pursuing de nitions is consistent among the early de nitional dialogues. More speci cally, there is no Òdemise of the elenchusÓ in a set of transitional dialogues, as Vlastos describes it. First, SocratesÕ manner of pursuing de nitions is not ÒelencticÓ (in the sense described). And, second, the fact that Socrates himself proposes de nitions in allegedly post-elenctic dialogues (that is, Lysis and Hippias Major) is consistent with his manner of pursuing de nitions. (4) In the early de nitional dialogues, © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003Phronesis XLVIII/4 Also available onlinewww.brill.nl Accepted June 2003 1 Some scholars lament the enormity of secondary literature on Plato. But I have always been grateful for it. This paper was written in a kind of isolation. The rst person to read or comment on it was an anonymous referee for Phronesis. Yet the paper would have been nothing had I not had the opportunity to think its problems over in light of previous contributions to the topic. My debts are plentiful and duly acknowledged...

Socrates’ Search for Laches’ Knowledge of Courage

“… Robinson (1953: 7).2 On the constructive interpretation of the elenchus, see e.g.,Vlastos (1983),Vlastos (1994),Adams (1998), andWolfsdorf (2003). On the non-constructive interpretation of the elenchus, see e.g.,Robinson (1953),Frede (1992),Benson (2000),Benson (2011),Stokes (1986), and Forster (2006).…”

“…But Socrates drops the language of co-deliberation when he focusses on Laches' knowledge of courage(190e7-193d2). See also note 29.15 On the constructive interpretation of the elenchus, see especiallyVlastos (1994),Adams (1998), andWolfsdorf (2003).16 See especiallyBenson (2000) and (2011).…”

“…The second-order focus of the inquiry is here clearly apparent. 27 See Adams(1998), andWolfsdorf (2003).Vlastos' adversarial model (1983Vlastos' adversarial model ( , 1994 of the elenchus is probably not vulnerable to this objection.…”

“… 15 On the constructive interpretation of the elenchus, see especially Vlastos (1994), Adams (1998), and Wolfsdorf (2003). …”

“… 27 See Adams (1998), and Wolfsdorf (2003). Vlastos’ adversarial model (1983, 1994) of the elenchus is probably not vulnerable to this objection. …”