Soft Power and Global Governance with Chinese Characteristics

Abstract

Some leading American theorists of China's global role, such as Shambaugh, Nye, Ikenberry, and many others have claimed that China has not managed to develop its soft/attractive power. Since China has not managed to attract the world to its culture, values, and ways, it has not found its place in global governance. Instead, China has become a power that punches below its weight. This article focuses on the empirical generalization, proposed by these American scholars, that China's soft power has failed and that this has resulted in that country's incomplete global engagement. The aim of this article is to show that this generalization is false by first questioning whether China really has failed in its soft power, and, secondly, by showing that the measuring sticks used to prove the incompleteness of China's global role are themselves flawed. Opinion polls that measure China's image in the world show that while China's popularity was on the rise in the first decade of the new millennium, its star began to decline after that. 2 Even when China did better at promoting its image, its popularity was of limited use, as its soft power never translated into foreign-policy power, according to Gill and Huang. 3 The evidence for China's soft-1 G.

Chinese foreign policy through the prism of «community of common destiny»

“…Finally, we can underline interesting overviews in the articles of the following authors: Callahan AW., "Dreaming as a Critical Discourse of National Belongings: China Dream, American Dream and World Dream" (Callahan, 2017), Godbole A., "China's Asia Strategy under President Xi Jinping" (Godbole, 2015), Kivimaki T., Soft Power and Global Governance with Chinese Characteristics" (Kivimaki, 2014) (Zeng, 2016).…”

Change and Continuity in China’s Soft Power Trajectory: From Mao Zedong’s “Peaceful Co-existence” to Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”

“…Callahan (2015) adds to the discussion by arguing that China has incorporated soft power aspects into its domestic policy more than into its foreign affairs (Callahan 2015, 217). Kivimäki (2014) also differentiates China's soft power policies from those of the US by stating that China does not aim to "attract other powers to the Chinese way of doing things or to the Chinese system" (Kivimäki 2014, 422) as in the case of other Western nations who desire to advance their culture into "universally desirable values" (Callahan 2015, 219).…”

“…Although liberal-democratic nations such as the US may utilize soft power to promote its ideological interests and establish certain global norms, this is not necessarily the case with China (Kivimäki 2014, 428). Kivimäki (2014) interprets China's applications of soft power to be primarily rooted in its domestic security interests; the maintenance of a positive image is an imperative for developing relations with other nations and for continuing economic growth under its distinct political system (Kivimäki 2014, 430). Callahan (2015) also notes that some goals that have been identified under China's soft power policies are to "fight those who see China as a threat, and cultivate those who see it as an opportunity" (Callahan 2015, 218).…”

The Concept of ‘Community of Common Destiny’ in China's Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications

“…Overseas scholars' research on CCD is scarcer. Jian Zhang and Timo Kivimaki touched upon CCD briefly in their analyses of Chinese new foreign policy and soft power strategy (Zhang ; Kivimaki ). However, these researchers failed to provide detailed and comprehensive answers to the above three questions.…”