SoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance

Heimbach, Lioba; Wattenhofer, Roger

doi:10.1145/3558535.3559784

Cited by 23 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…DeFi and DEX are receiving a lot of attention amid new technological innovations in blockchain, but at the same time, they are facing various security threats. Various attack techniques such as smart contract vulnerabilities, market manipulation, and frontrunning are emerging as major threats in this field [3,4]. The emergence of MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) bots, one of the major threats, is gaining profits through vulnerabilities in decentralized finance and causing losses in commissions and exchange fees for users' transaction execution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized Exchange Transaction Analysis and Maximal Extractable Value Attack Identification: Focusing on Uniswap USDC3

Choi,

Kim

2024

Electronics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the advancement of blockchain technology and growing concerns about the vulnerabilities and mistrust in centralized financial services, decentralized finance (DeFi) and decentralized exchanges (DEXs) have emerged as promising alternatives. This paper delves into the challenges and issues within DeFi, with a particular focus on Uniswap. We highlight the susceptibility to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks, providing a background on the current state of DeFi and DEXs. Our approach includes a detailed transaction analysis on Uniswap to identify and analyze MEV attack patterns, alongside a method for detecting bots. The results offer critical insights into the nature of various attacks in DEXs and the correlation between internal and external blockchain events and MEV attack patterns. This research provides valuable guidelines for enhancing DEX security and mitigating MEV risks, serving as an essential resource for stakeholders in the DeFi ecosystem.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized Exchange Transaction Analysis and Maximal Extractable Value Attack Identification: Focusing on Uniswap USDC3

Choi,

Kim

2024

Electronics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Decentralized finance (DeFi), as a financial instrument deployed on the blockchain, allows users to conduct financial transactions without intermediaries and thus has attracted much interest in recent years. Although DeFi continues to gain popularity, recent works [5,11,12,17,33,44] have shown that DeFi suffers from adversarial transaction order manipulation attacks, where the malicious miners (or leaders) have the power to select transactions sent by users for agreement and determine the final order of them to maximize their profits. For instance, consider a victim transaction tx v that purchases a particular asset, the price of which will increase after the execution of tx v .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Separation is Good: A Faster Order-Fairness Byzantine Consensus

Mu,

Yin,

Asheralieva

et al. 2024

Proceedings 2024 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Order-fairness has been introduced recently as a new property for Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol to prevent unilaterally deciding the final order of transactions, which allows mitigating the threat of adversarial transaction order manipulation attacks (e.g., front-running) in blockchain networks and decentralized finance (DeFi). However, existing leader-based order-fairness protocols (which do not rely on synchronized clocks) still suffer from poor performance since they strongly couple fair ordering with consensus processes. In this paper, we propose SpeedyFair, a high-performance orderfairness consensus protocol, which is motivated by our insight that the ordering of transactions does not rely on the execution results of transactions in previous proposals (after consensus). SpeedyFair achieves its efficiency through a decoupled design that performs fair ordering individually and consecutively, separating from consensus. In addition, by decoupling fair ordering from consensus, SpeedyFair enables parallelizing the order/verify mode that was originally executed serially in the consensus process, which further speeds up the performance. We implement a prototype of SpeedyFair on the top of the Hotstuff protocol. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that SpeedyFair significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art order-fairness protocol (i.e., Themis), which achieves a throughput of 1.5×-2.45× greater than Themis while reducing latency by 35%-59%.

show abstract

Aion: Secure Transaction Ordering Using TEEs

Zarbafian,

Gramoli

2024

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

SoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance

Cited by 23 publications

References 21 publications

Decentralized Exchange Transaction Analysis and Maximal Extractable Value Attack Identification: Focusing on Uniswap USDC3

Decentralized Exchange Transaction Analysis and Maximal Extractable Value Attack Identification: Focusing on Uniswap USDC3

Separation is Good: A Faster Order-Fairness Byzantine Consensus

Aion: Secure Transaction Ordering Using TEEs

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About