Some Conceptual and Theoretical Issues in Resource Theory of Social Exchange

Törnblom, Kjell; Kazemi, Ali

doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-4175-5_3

Cited by 18 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Concreteness describes a resource's degree of tangibility. A resource is tangible if it represents something physical that can be touched and intangible if not (Törnblom and Kazemi 2012). Foa and Foa (1974) present six resource categories with varying particularism and concreteness: money, goods, services, love, status, and information (see Figure 1), which are supported in empirical research (Brinberg and Wood 1983).…”

Section: Theoretical Background Srt and The Nature Of Exchanged Resoumentioning

confidence: 85%

“…Beyond this intercategory variation of particularism and concreteness, recent SRT research extends Foa's framework, arguing that single resource categories also vary in these properties (Törnblom and Kazemi 2012). This intracategory variation builds on Foa and Foa's (1974) original idea that resource categories represent a taxonomy of meanings assigned to actions.…”

Section: Theoretical Background Srt and The Nature Of Exchanged Resoumentioning

confidence: 92%

“…One stream refers to the nature of exchanged resources that are proposed to vary in their particularism (i.e., more or less personal) and concreteness (i.e., more or less tangible; Foa and Foa 1974). These variations occur not only across categories but also within each category: A single resource category can possess different levels of particularism and concreteness (Törnblom and Kazemi 2012). Transferring this intracategorial variation to service recovery, we consider compensation as offering the resource category money to customers after a failure in a more or less particularistic and concrete way.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Compensation Revisited

Roschk

Gelbrich

2017

Journal of Service Research

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This research examines how to recompense customers, from a social resource theory perspective, which portrays financial compensation as the act of offering the resource "money" to customers during a service recovery attempt. This resource can differ in its particularism (is the money offered in a more or less personal way?) and concreteness (is the money offered in a more or less tangible way?), which are shown in two experiments to affect recovery outcomes. Specifically, personal compensation accompanied by a handwritten note from the service person (vs. impersonal: a typewritten note from the firm) fosters recovery satisfaction, mediated by justice perceptions, and reciprocal customer behavior (tipping, cross-buying), mediated by an obligation to reciprocate. Tangible compensation in the form of a banknote or banknote-like coupon (vs. intangible: a credit entry) also fosters reciprocal customer behavior via the obligation to reciprocate. In both studies, relationship strength amplifies the indirect effect of compensation's particularism on recovery satisfaction. As a theoretical contribution, we show that the way the monetary resource is presented matters for service recovery. As a major managerial takeaway, this research presents personal (vs. impersonal) compensation as an impactful property of compensation: It increases recovery outcomes without additional monetary costs. Further, managers learn that handing over the money in a personal and tangible way can be a way to increase monetary returns to the firm in the form of tipping and cross-buying.

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Section: Theoretical Background Srt and The Nature Of Exchanged Resoumentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Theoretical Background Srt and The Nature Of Exchanged Resoumentioning

confidence: 92%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Compensation Revisited

Roschk

Gelbrich

2017

Journal of Service Research

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“…Contrary to particularistic resources (e.g., love, status and, to a lesser extent, services), the values of universalistic resources (with the exception of information) are not dependent on the identity of the provider or the relationship between the provider and recipient. Further, for money and goods (and, to a lesser extent, information) the amount THEORY OF MAXIMALLY UNFAIR ALLOCATIONS 16 lost by the giver is equivalent to the amount gained by the recipient (see also Törnblom and Kazemi, 2012). Thus, we can expect that the choice and meaning of MUA for money most likely differs from that of love in multiparty situations due to these two (and other) differences between universalistic and particularistic resources.…”

Section: Future Development Of Mua Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Look at Individual Differences in Perceptions of Unfairness: The Theory of Maximally Unfair Allocations in Multiparty Situations

2015

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Previous research has demonstrated that unfairness judgments of resource allocations become more complex when there are more than two recipients. In order to explain some of this complexity, we propose a set of psychological mechanisms that may underlie four different choices of maximally unfair resource allocations (MUA): Self-Single-Loser, Self-One-Loser-of-Many, Self-Single-Winner, and Self-One-Winner-of-Many. From this psychological theory several predictions are derived and tested in vignette studies involving a total of 708 participants recruited online using MTurk. As predicted by our theory, (1) choices of MUA where there is a single loser were much more common when the allocated resource was of negative rather than positive valence, and (2) the amount of egoistic bias individuals exhibited when judging the unfairness in receiving a small rather than a large share in a nonextreme multi-party allocation was predicted by their choices of MUA. These findings suggest that an individual's choice of MUA reveals some generally relevant principles of how unfairness is perceived in multi-party allocations. This opens up new lines of inquiry, especially regarding social dilemmas.

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“…Moreover, as Messick (1995) notes, although there is consensus about using equality in terms of the equal shares principle in the allocation of public goods, problems may still arise. Specifically, the type of resource to be allocated is important (Törnblom and Kazemi, 2012b). Messick discusses the problem of identifying ways to allocate an expensive oriental carpet between two persons who have equal claims to the carpet.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equity, Equal Shares or Equal Final Outcomes? Group Goal Guides Allocations of Public Goods

2017

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In an experiment we investigate preferences for allocation of a public good among group members who contributed unequally in providing the public good. Inducing the group goal of productivity resulted in preferences for equitable allocations, whereas inducing the group goals of harmony and social concern resulted in preferences for equal final outcomes. The study makes a contribution by simultaneously treating provision and allocation of a public good, thus viewing these as related processes. Another contribution is that a new paradigm is introduced that bears closer resemblance to real life public good dilemmas than previous research paradigms do.

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Some Conceptual and Theoretical Issues in Resource Theory of Social Exchange

Cited by 18 publications

References 56 publications

Compensation Revisited

Compensation Revisited

A New Look at Individual Differences in Perceptions of Unfairness: The Theory of Maximally Unfair Allocations in Multiparty Situations

Equity, Equal Shares or Equal Final Outcomes? Group Goal Guides Allocations of Public Goods

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