Some Remarks on Obligation, Permission, and Supererogation

Forrester, Mary Gore

doi:10.1086/291959

Cited by 13 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…10 Secondly, and due to the prescriptive force of these standards, perfectionists are often preoccupied with what is referred to as 'concern over mistakes': a fear of failing to meet the standards in question. 11 Perfectionism has been defined by some as "the tendency to believe there is a perfect solution to every problem, that doing something perfectly (i.e., mistake-free) is not only possible, but also necessary, and that even minor mistakes will have serious consequences." 12 Gordon Flett and Paul Hewitt cite many studies that demonstrate deny that they are a type of imperfect duty without needing to claim that they are not acts that ought to be done in any sense of the term.…”

Section: Psychological Perfectionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological perfectionism and the paradox of obligation (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2013. Part I: The CAPE International Conference “Ethics and Well-being”)

Benn

2014

CAPE Studies in Applied Philosophy and Ethics Series

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Section: Psychological Perfectionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological perfectionism and the paradox of obligation (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2013. Part I: The CAPE International Conference “Ethics and Well-being”)

Benn

2014

CAPE Studies in Applied Philosophy and Ethics Series

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“…Normative theories might be correct of moral obligation (Baier ; Richards , 96‐101; Forrester , 219–26), but they are clearly not correct of legal obligation. The idea that one might, as a matter of morality, be justifiably sanctioned for not doing x makes sense where there are no formal mechanisms for sanctioning x , but the same cannot be said for the idea that one might, as a matter of legality , be justifiably sanctioned for not doing x where there are no legal mechanisms for sanctioning x .…”

Section: The Special Normative Force Of Obligations: Obligations As Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ties that Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Obligation

Himma

2013

Ratio Juris

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Legal positivism lacks a comprehensive theory of legal obligation. Hart's account of legal obligation, if successful, would explain only how the rule of recognition obligates officials. There is nothing in Hart's account of social obligation and social norms that would explain how the legal norms that govern citizen behavior give rise to legal obligations. However, we cannot give a theoretical explanation of the concept of legal obligation without a theoretical explanation of the concept of obligation. If legal, social and moral obligations are three instances of the kind defined by “obligation,” then we cannot successfully explicate the nature of legal, social or moral obligations without a successful general conceptual theory of obligation. In what follows, I attempt to develop what I take to be the central elements of the general concept of obligation. I argue that obligations are (1) associated with mandatory prescriptions; (2) reasons for action; (3) exclusionary in the sense that certain reasons are excluded as an excuse of justification for non‐performance; and (4) “binding” in the sense that they have a special normative force. At the end of the paper, I briefly argue that our shared concept of obligation is indeterminate with respect to one theoretically important case, the issue of whether the rules of a crime gang that includes some sort of rule‐defining procedures for making rules governing members obligate gang members if accepted as legitimate by the members.

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Obligation: A Legal-Theoretical Perspective

Bertea

2014

Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following

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Some Remarks on Obligation, Permission, and Supererogation

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Psychological perfectionism and the paradox of obligation (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2013. Part I: The CAPE International Conference “Ethics and Well-being”)

Psychological perfectionism and the paradox of obligation (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2013. Part I: The CAPE International Conference “Ethics and Well-being”)

The Ties that Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Obligation

Obligation: A Legal-Theoretical Perspective

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