Some Unpleasant General Equilibrium Implications of Executive Incentive Compensation Contracts

Donaldson, John B.; Gershun, Natalia; Giannoni, Marc P.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1344109

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…As regards the first two factors, our results are akin to the experience accumulated in the literature that studies implications of the manager incentive scheme choice under separation of ownership and control in DSGE models (cf. Donaldson et al, 2009). Awareness of the costs of the third (non-linear capital charge) factor has so far been widespread among practitioners.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Bubbles, Bank Credit and Macroprudential Policies

Derviz

2013

SSRN Journal

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Information on all of the papers published in the ECB Working Paper Series can be found on the ECB's website, http://www.ecb. europa.eu/pub/scientific/wps/date/html/index.en.html Macroprudential Research NetworkThis paper presents research conducted within the Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs). The network is composed of economists from the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), i.e. the national central banks of the 27 European Union (EU) Member States and the European Central Bank. The objective of MaRs is to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and/or tools supporting macro-prudential supervision in the EU.The research is carried out in three work streams: 1) Macro-financial models linking financial stability and the performance of the economy; 2) Early warning systems and systemic risk indicators; 3) Assessing contagion risks.MaRs is chaired by Philipp Hartmann (ECB). Paolo Angelini (Banca d'Italia), Laurent Clerc (Banque de France), Carsten Detken (ECB), Simone Manganelli (ECB) and Katerina Šmídková (Czech National Bank) are workstream coordinators. Javier Suarez (Center for Monetary and Financial Studies) and Hans Degryse (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Tilburg University) act as external consultants. Fiorella De Fiore (ECB) and Kalin Nikolov (ECB) share responsibility for the MaRs Secretariat.The refereeing process of this paper has been coordinated by a team composed of Gerhard Rünstler, Kalin Nikolov and Bernd Schwaab (all ECB).The paper is released in order to make the research of MaRs generally available, in preliminary form, to encourage comments and suggestions prior to final publication. The views expressed in the paper are the ones of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or of the ESCB.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Bubbles, Bank Credit and Macroprudential Policies

Derviz

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…No other contract can improve upon what is already a Pareto optimum. A formal derivation is provided inDonaldson et al (2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

Executive compensation: A general equilibrium perspective

Danthine

Donaldson

2015

Review of Economic Dynamics

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Some Unpleasant General Equilibrium Implications of Executive Incentive Compensation Contracts

Cited by 2 publications

References 32 publications

Bubbles, Bank Credit and Macroprudential Policies

Bubbles, Bank Credit and Macroprudential Policies

Executive compensation: A general equilibrium perspective

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