Some Varieties of Metaethical Relativism

Olinder, Ragnar Francén

doi:10.1111/phc3.12347

Cited by 4 publications

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“…Other responses are based on metalinguistic negotiations (see Sundell (2013 and, Khoo and Knobe (2016), Silk (2016: 125-6 and 2017: 214 and 222-5 (though see Finlay (2017)) and Sodoma (2021: §5)), proposition clouds (Suikkanen 2019), or rejecting our semantic intuitions about disagreements (see Rovane (2013: 30 and 113), Velleman (2015: 55 and 76), Finlay (2017 and 202) and for a discussion see Sodoma (2021: §3.1)). For an overview, see Francén Olinder (2016), Finlay (2017), andRowland (2021: §3.3). account of the connection to motivation is along the right lines, we know that in their exchange, even if A and B are talking about different properties of typing thank-you notes, they are also guaranteed to have conflicting motivational attitudes towards those actions.…”

Section: Different Contextualists Can Then Formulate In Different Way...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Subjectivism, Relativism, and Contextualism

Suikkanen

2023

The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics

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There is a family of metaethical views according to which (i) there are no objectively correct moral standards and (ii) whether a given moral claim is true depends in some way on moral standards accepted by either an individual (forms of subjectivism) or a community (forms of relativism). This chapter outlines the three most important versions of this type of theories: old-fashioned subjectivism and relativism, contextualism and new wave subjectivism and relativism. It also explores the main advantages of these views and the key objections to them.

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Section: Different Contextualists Can Then Formulate In Different Way...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5)). For overviews of the issues covered here, see alsoRachels (1991),Wong (1991),Dreier (2006), MacFarlane (2012),Sturgeon (2010), Francén Olinder (2016,Silk (2018),Stojanovic (2018) andBjörnsson (2021).…”

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Subjectivism, Relativism, and Contextualism

Suikkanen

2023

The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics

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“…This is consistent because the error theorist can deny both that "not permissible" entails "impermissible" and that "not impermissible" entails "permissible"(Olson, 2014, p. 14).17 Error theorists would thus deny that normative vagueness exists(Dougherty, 2018, p. 191).18 For surveys, seeRachels, 1991, Wong, 1991, Dreier, 2009, and Francén Olinder, 2016 …”

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Anti-luminosity and anti-realism in metaethics

Suikkanen

2024

Synthese

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This paper begins by applying a version of Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to normative properties. This argument suggests that there must be at least some unknowable normative facts in normative Sorites sequences, or otherwise we get a contradiction given certain plausible assumptions concerning safety requirements on knowledge and our doxastic dispositions. This paper then focuses on the question of how the defenders of different forms of metaethical anti-realism (namely, error theorists, subjectivists, relativists, contextualists, expressivists, response dependence theorists, and constructivists) could respond to the explanatory challenge created by the previous argument. It argues that, with two exceptions, the metaethical anti-realists need not challenge the argument itself, but rather they can find ways to explain how the unknowable normative facts can obtain. These explanations are based on the idea that our own attitudes on which the normative facts are grounded need not be transparent to us either. Reaching this conclusion also illuminates how metaethical anti-realists can make sense of instances of normative vagueness more generally.

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The Relativistic Car: Applying Metaethics to the Debate about Self-Driving Vehicles

Pölzler

2021

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Almost all participants in the debate about the ethics of accidents with self-driving cars have so far assumed moral universalism. However, universalism may be philosophically more controversial than is commonly thought, and may lead to undesirable results in terms of non-moral consequences and feasibility. There thus seems to be a need to also start considering what I refer to as the “relativistic car” — a car that is programmed under the assumption that what is morally right, wrong, good, bad, etc. is determined by the moral beliefs of one’s society or culture. My investigation of this idea involves six steps. First, I explain why and how the moral universalism/relativism debate is relevant to the issue of self-driving cars. Second, I argue that there are good reasons to consider accident algorithms that assume relativism. Third, I outline how a relativistic car would be programmed to behave. Fourth, I address what advantages such a car would have, both in terms of its non-moral consequences and feasibility. Fifth, I address the relativistic car’s disadvantages. Finally, I qualify and conclude my considerations.

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Some Varieties of Metaethical Relativism

Cited by 4 publications

References 50 publications

Subjectivism, Relativism, and Contextualism

Subjectivism, Relativism, and Contextualism

Anti-luminosity and anti-realism in metaethics

The Relativistic Car: Applying Metaethics to the Debate about Self-Driving Vehicles

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