2021
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12836
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Something is true

Abstract: The thesis that nothing is true has long been thought to be a self‐refuting position not worthy of serious philosophical consideration. Recently, however, the thesis of alethic nihilism—that nothing is true—has been explicitly defended (notably by David Liggins). Nihilism is also, I argue, a consequence of other views about truth that have recently been advocated, such as fictionalism about truth and the inconsistency account. After offering an account of alethic nihilism, and how it purports to avoid the self… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
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References 57 publications
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