Sortals, bodies, and variables. A critique of Quine’s theory of reference

Abstract

Among the philosophical accounts of reference, Quine’s (1974) The Roots of Reference stands out in offering an integrated account of the acquisition of linguistic reference and object individuation. Based on a non-referential ability to distinguish bodies, the acquisition of sortals and quantification are crucial steps in learning to refer to objects. In this article, we critically re-assess Quine’s account of reference. Our critique will proceed in three steps with the aim of showing that Quine effectively presupposes what he sets out to explain, namely, reference to objects. We are going to argue (i) that sortals do not individuate, (ii) that bodies are already objects, and (iii) that the acquisition of variables presupposes a notion of identity. The result is diagnostic of a central desideratum for any theory of reference: an explanation of spatiotemporal object individuation.