Sorting of Candidates: Evidence from 20,000 Electoral Ballots

Abstract

Using over 20,000 electoral ballots from proportional representation elections, we document that political parties systematically sort candidates on the ballots according to their valence and intra party value. Valence, measured by education level, captures the public value of the candidates, while intra party value, measured by political donations and membership, represents the value of the candidate to the party. The patterns we observe are consistent with market mechanisms between candidates and party leaders where the party leaders benefit from the valence and intra party value of candidates and offer ballot positions (i.e. the probability of winning a seat) in exchange. We show that candidates with high valence and those who possess more intra party value are placed in higher level positions, despite the fact that candidates with more intra party value tend to receive relatively fewer votes than their counterparts with the same characteristics in the same position on the ballot. We also show that as a party expects to hold more council seats and thus has more bargaining power over candidates, the share of their candidates with higher intra party value increases. Overall, we provide strong evidence that political parties skew political representation based on a quid pro quo relationship with the candidates.

Party Nomination Strategies in List Proportional Representation Systems

“…Our contestability measure has important advantages relative to recent approaches in Cox et al (2020) and Svitáková and Šoltés (2020), which focus exclusively on ranking (or ranking relative to electoral performance in the most recent election). First, the relative safety of a list rank differs widely based on historical electoral performance: The 20th rank on one ballot might be much safer than the top rank on another ballot.…”

Homophily in voting behavior: Evidence from preferential voting

“…Buisseret et al (2022) show that candidates are ranked according to their quality (measured by candidates' education, occupation, leadership skills and cognitive abilities), while Galasso and Nannicini (2015) observe that the top positions are filled by party officers and former deputies (Members of Parliament) who are loyal to the party. In the Czech Republic, Svitáková and Šoltés (2020) show that Czech parties tend to allocate the top ballot positions to better‐educated candidates or to those with high intra‐party value (party members or donors).…”

Party Nomination Strategies in List Proportional Representation Systems

“…Our contestability measure has important advantages relative to recent approaches in Cox et al. (2020) and Svitáková and Šoltés (2020), which focus exclusively on ranking (or ranking relative to electoral performance in the most recent election). First, the relative safety of a list rank differs widely based on historical electoral performance: The 20th rank on one ballot might be much safer than the top rank on another ballot.…”

“…In the Swedish National Election Survey, electing 'competent politicians that can handle the country's affairs' consistently ranks as a key motivation for party choice, on par with party ideology. Across a range of empirical operationalizations, more competent politicians draw more preference votes(Dal Bó et al 2017;Loewen et al 2014;Williams and Indridason 2018).3 A related formulation of the Marginal Rank hypothesis appears inGalasso and Nannicini (2015) Svitáková and Šoltés (2020). report positive evidence for the Marginal Rank hypothesis in a large sample of list PR elections in the Czech Republic.…”