On 6 November 2010, during his maiden visit to the sub-continent, President Barack Obama delivered what came to be seen in both India and Pakistan as a disappointing speech. 1 Opposition leaders in India claimed that the president did not go far enough to reprimand Pakistan to dismantle terrorist hubs ensconced within its borders. Indeed, he did not once mention Pakistan. This was considered unacceptable. He was, after all, giving the speech in Mumbai, a city that had been witness to devastating attacks in November 2008. 2 The attackers all hailed from Pakistan. In Pakistan, the entire US administration was berated for warming up to India, and this, when Pakistan serves as a frontline state in the war against terror. 3 Further, the fact that the president's following address to the Indian Parliament did not mention Kashmir did little to inspire confidence amongst an elite who have long advocated third-party intervention to resolve this age old conflict. 4 In many ways, the reactions to Obama's visit to India exemplify the difficult task of balancing US interests and relations with South Asia's two nuclear giants. In the current milieu, this undertaking has taken on an all important dimension-Indian and Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan. A key aim of US foreign policy has been to convince Pakistan to focus on anti-Coalition insurgent groups along the Durand line rather than the Indian army to its east. This is essential if the US and its allies are to achieve some degree of progress in 'degrading' the Afghan Taliban along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. As is widely believed, campaign progress against insurgents on one side of the border is at least partially dependent upon progress on the other. 5 Given the implicit significance of the role played by India, either in its bilateral relations with Pakistan or because of its expanding presence in Afghanistan, the