South Korea: Temporary Trade Barriers Before and During the Crisis

Kang, Moonsung; Park, Soonchan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1836282

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Furthermore, when countries did resort to protection barriers during the Great Recession, they followed expected patterns to favor politically influential sectors. Kang and Park (2011) find that the industry targeting of Korean trade barriers favors the politically organized sectors, although there was no surge in the number of antidumping and safeguard initiations during the 2008 crisis. Argentina is one of the emerging market economies that increased its use of protection during the crisis with both more initiations and higher value of imports affected by measures (Moore 2011).…”

Section: Hard Times and Protectionismmentioning

confidence: 90%

Cooperation in Hard Times

Davis

Pelc

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Hard times give rise to greater demand for protection. International trade rules include provisions that allow for raising barriers to aid industries when they suffer economic injury. Yet widespread use of flexibility measures may undermine the trade system and worsen economic conditions. How do states balance these conflicting pressures? This article assesses the effect of crises on cooperation in trade. We hypothesize that governments impose less protectionism during economic crisis when economic troubles are widespread across countries than when they face crisis in isolation. The lesson of Smoot-Hawley and coordination through international economic institutions represent mechanisms of informal governance that encourage cooperation to avoid a spiral of protectionism. Analysis of industry-level data on protection measures for the period from 1996 to 2011 provides support for our claim that under conditions of shared hard times, states exercise strategic selfrestraint to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies.

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Section: Hard Times and Protectionismmentioning

confidence: 90%

Cooperation in Hard Times

Davis

Pelc

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Using semi‐annual data on Korean AD investigations between 1987 and 2003, for instance, Mah and Kim () find a unidirectional causality that runs from AD investigation to real GDP growth and that AD duties lead to a slowdown in the overall economic activities in Korea. Alternatively, to examine the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on AD imposition, Kang and Park () use Korean AD cases that were initiated between 1986 and 2010 and find that Korea has increasingly initiated AD investigations over a broader number of sectors during the global crisis of 2008–09, especially to the politically organised sectors . While these studies are closely related to our work in that they examine Korean AD policy by using cases from the Korea Trade Commission, we focus on the impact of AD imposition on performance and behaviour of Korean firms once they receive a temporary protection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti‐dumping Duty and Firm Heterogeneity: Evidence from Korea

Sun

Lee

2016

World Economy

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1 Countervailing duties are tariffs in addition to ordinary custom duties that are imposed to counteract certain subsidies bestowed on exporters by their governments. Alternatively, safeguard measures are defined as temporary trade restrictions, typically tariffs or quotas, which are imposed in response to import surges that could lead to 'serious injury' to a competing industry in importing countries. While there is no concrete answer as to why countries frequently use AD measures, many economists point out its arbitrary rules and unlikelihood of provoking trade retaliation. In particular, since WTO AD rules are not grounded on microeconomics, any investigative authority can impose WTO-consistent AD duties under any possible scenario. For instance, while dumping should be determined by investigating price behaviour of foreign firms, in many reported cases, dumping is determined based on foreign firms' profitability rather than price. Moreover, unlike the safeguard statute, WTO AD rules are known for not requiring the AD duty-imposing country to offer compensating tariff reduction to the affected country. 2 According to the Korea Trade Commission reports and statistics, Korea has initiated 121 AD investigations and eight safeguard investigations over the post-WTO period, while 25 AD and 25 safeguard investigations were initiated during the pre-WTO period . Examining the countries accused of dumping, while developed countries such as the European Community, Japan and the United States, accounted for 52 per cent of all AD investigations during the pre-WTO period, developing countries accounted for 62.7 per cent of all AD investigations over the post-WTO period. Among these developing countries, in particular, 73 per cent of AD investigations were initiated against Asian countries, of which China accounted for the largest share (33 per cent).3 Several trade studies also analyse foreign exporting firms' behavioural responses to AD duties; for instance, Anderson (1992Anderson ( , 1993, Ohno (1998), Blonigen andPark (2004) examine firms' dumping behaviour under different ex ante expectations that AD investigation will likely occur, while Blonigen and Haynes (2002) study firms' pricing behaviour under AD duties. Moreover, considering that AD procedures reveal cost information of domestic and foreign firms through the injury inquiry and dumping margin determination, Staiger and Wolak (1992b), Prusa (1992), Hartigan (1994), Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) examine AD duty effects on collusive behaviour between domestic and foreign firms in a protected market.

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Enforcing Openness: Trade Protectionism and Intervention in Civil Wars

Aydın

2021

Civil Wars

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South Korea: Temporary Trade Barriers Before and During the Crisis

Cited by 4 publications

References 26 publications

Cooperation in Hard Times

Cooperation in Hard Times

Anti‐dumping Duty and Firm Heterogeneity: Evidence from Korea

Enforcing Openness: Trade Protectionism and Intervention in Civil Wars

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