South Sudan's Civil War Will Not End with a Peace Deal

Abstract

In early 2017, the government of South Sudan declared that parts of the country had been hit by severe famine. This famine was another sign of the many ways in which a disastrous war was killing people. South Sudan had at that point been in a civil war for three years, with the humanitarian situation steadily deteriorating since war broke out in December 2013. The governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its army, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), had split following a long-brewing political conflict. In the first few days of the war, political rivalry had turned into fierce fighting; killings were targeted along ethnic lines. President Salva Kiir remained in charge of the government and the national army, while a coalition of military commanders headed by former Vice President Riek Machar became the SPLM-in Opposition (SPLM-iO). The first scrambled international efforts after fighting started supported a quick, but unsuccessful, ceasefire. After one and a half years of negotiations, and pressure applied by the international community, government and opposition signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in August 2015, which stipulated that the two warring parties would share power in government. What was intended as a peace deal, however, continues to make South Sudan more violent as despite the agreement, violence continues to spread. I n July 2016, renewed fighting between the forces of the government and the SPLM-iO forced opposition leader Machar to flee the country. The United Nations (UN) has since accused the government of preparing genocide. And yet, the international community, the government, and parts of the opposition

If They Endorse It, I Can't Trust It: How Outgroup Leader Endorsements Undercut Public Support for Civil War Peace Settlements

“…If ingroup endorsements appear both noncredible and nonthreatening, then they may not convey new information about costs and benefits of a policy or lead individuals to update their level of support. De Juan and Pierskalla (2016, 71) argue that the failure of a group to protect its supporters “communicates low competence”; in South Sudan, there is evidence that civilians do not view as credible calls for peace from either side (de Vries and Schomerus 2017).…”

“…However, there is reason to question the applicability of these findings to the conflict setting we study. In contexts such as South Sudan, where both sides have been repeatedly blamed for relapses in violence and broken peace deals, ingroup leaders may not emerge completely unscathed in the eyes of their coethnics (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; de Vries and Schomerus 2017; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013). If people begin to question the ability of ingroup leaders to deliver peace, then a noncredible but nonthreatening ingroup endorsement may not convey new information about the costs and benefits of the policy and may not lead individuals to update their level of support.…”

Rule of whose law? The geography of authority in Juba, South Sudan

“…1.For the wider context of South Sudan's successive crises and civil wars over 2013 to 2018, see Johnson (2014); de Waal (2014, 2016a); Amnesty International (2016); Center for Civilians in Conflict (2016); Kindersley & Rolandsen (2016); de Vries & Schomerus (2017). …”

Handle with Care! A Qualitative Comparison of the Fragile States Index's Bottom Three Countries: Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan

“…The renewed war only indirectly affected these more stable regions — for instance, repressive behaviour by government forces following rumours of renewed rebellions and confrontations between sedentary farmers and armed cattle herders. However, these areas have been increasingly drawn into the conflict, and — for a lack of differentiated analyses and policy — are put into the opposition‐versus‐government binary, irrespective of the fact that their interests have little to do with either side (ICG, ; de Vries and Schomerus, ).…”