2016
DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2015.1049520
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Sovereignty, the ‘resource curse’ and the limits of good governance: a political economy of oil in Ghana

Abstract: If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

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Cited by 57 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Although oil windfalls often decrease the quality of public spending in oil-rich countries, the Ghanaian government seems to behave rationally. They implemented the sovereign wealth funds that aims to protect against oil price volatility and save revenue for future generations [Phillips et al 2016]. They provided legislation against unaccountable government spending of oil revenue that ensures transparency, accountability and sustainability in managing revenue from natural resources.…”
Section: Ghana's Economy and Its Vulnerability To The Dutch Diseasementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although oil windfalls often decrease the quality of public spending in oil-rich countries, the Ghanaian government seems to behave rationally. They implemented the sovereign wealth funds that aims to protect against oil price volatility and save revenue for future generations [Phillips et al 2016]. They provided legislation against unaccountable government spending of oil revenue that ensures transparency, accountability and sustainability in managing revenue from natural resources.…”
Section: Ghana's Economy and Its Vulnerability To The Dutch Diseasementioning
confidence: 99%
“…A further example from the oil sector is the 'scandalously generous' (Phillips et al, 2016: 30) deal with Kosmos Energy in 2004, which many believe was meant to generate kickbacks for allies in the Kufuor-led NPP ruling coalition. Industry analysts estimated that the Kosmos contract would mean the government would lose US$3.8 billion in tax revenues over the lifespan of the West Cape Three Points oil block, in comparison to Tullow Oil's terms for the adjacent Deepwater Tano block (Wood Mackenzie 2012, cited in Phillips et al, 2016). Ayee et al (2011) also argue that overgenerous concessions granted to some mining companies may have been granted 'as a reward for political support and financial kickbacks' (2011: 21).…”
Section: Competitive Clientelism and Mining In Ghanamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, it has been argued that the energy infrastructures in most parts of the global South are connected to historical antecedents in the socioeconomic and political realms, and hence, their development is shaped by various path dependencies (Power et al 2016). Moreover, the enthusiasm and contestations exuded by the two dominant political parties (the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress) in the wake of the discovery of oil in 2007 (Phillips, Hailwood and Brooks 2016), and the subsequent improved gas infrastructure development compared to the weak RE infrastructure development, vindicate the existing infrastructural dominance of thermal-led energy.…”
Section: Ids Bulletinmentioning
confidence: 99%