Soviet Strategic Air Defense and the Stealth Challenge

Lepingwell, John W.R.

doi:10.2307/2538855

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Modernizing its bomber fleet would have been considered a priority programme within SAC, especially if the new bombers were to incorporate radical new technology that promised to render Soviet air defences obsolete. 83 Despite being officially part of the Air Force, SAC had long considered itself largely autonomous. Certainly in the 1950s and 1960s, SAC commanders such as General Curtis LeMay were a power unto themselves.…”

Section: The Services Back Their Pet Programmes To the Hiltmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weapons without a cause: Buying stealth bombers the American way

Farrell

1993

Arms Control

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: The Services Back Their Pet Programmes To the Hiltmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weapons without a cause: Buying stealth bombers the American way

Farrell

1993

Arms Control

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Long‐range nuclear cruise missiles and stability

Lewis

Postol

1992

Science & Global Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles are highly accurate and are capable of reaching most targets within the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from launch points beyond their borders. Neither the United States nor the CIS has air surveillance systems capable of providing reliable warning against cruise missiles. Thus it is possible that a small-scale cruise missile attack could go entirely undetected until the nuclear weapons arrived over their targets. Such an attack could destroy the other country's entire strategic bomber force on the ground and severely damage its strategic command and control system, perhaps to the point of endangering the ability of its ICBM force to be launched on warning. This capability makes long-range nuclear cruise missiles potentially one of the most destabilizing of all nuclear weapons. INTRODUCTIONLong-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles* are widely perceived as stabilizing additions to the US and CIS nuclear arsenals. This perception arises primarily from their relatively low speed, which is viewed as making them unsuitable for use in a first-strike nuclear attack. However, this simple characterization neglects more troubling aspects of these weapons. Cruise missiles are already the most accurate of all strategic nuclear missiles. More * We will generally omit the words "long-range nuclear-armed" from in front of "cruise missiles." Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent references to cruise missiles should be understood to mean long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 00:16 22 June 2016 50 Lewis and Postolimportant, neither the United States nor the CIS has air surveillance systems capable of reliably detecting cruise missiles. This raises the possibility that cruise missiles could be used in a zero-warning nuclear attack. Viewed from this perspective, cruise missiles may be among the most destabilizing of all nuclear weapons.Despite the end of the Cold War, both the United States and the CIS continue to maintain large strategic nuclear arsenals, key parts of which are ultimately dependent on tactical warning for their survivability. Systems for providing such warning take many years to construct, and efforts to improvise warning capabilities if relations deteriorate or if a crisis arises could result in dangerous false alarms. As long as both countries continue to rely on strategic nuclear forces that are dependent on warning for survivability they should not neglect the health of their warning capabilities.This paper considers the threat to stability posed by cruise missiles. It begins with a discussion of relevant technical characteristics of cruise missiles. Next we assess the capabilities of the US air surveillance system and conclude that it is not capable of providing reliable warning of small-scale cruise missile attacks.* Given these warning deficiencies, the ways cruise missiles might be used in zero-warning nuclear surprise attacks are discussed and the resulting threat to stability is as...

show abstract

The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s

Brown¹

1989

International Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Soviet Strategic Air Defense and the Stealth Challenge

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

Weapons without a cause: Buying stealth bombers the American way

Weapons without a cause: Buying stealth bombers the American way

Long‐range nuclear cruise missiles and stability

The U.S. Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About