Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition: On the Note to B160 in Kant'sCritique of Pure Reason

Abstract

In his argument for the possibility of knowledge of spatial objects, in the Transcendental Deduction of the B-version of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a crucial distinction between space as “form of intuition” and space as “formal intuition.” The traditional interpretation regards the distinction between the two notions as reflecting a distinction between indeterminate space and determinations of space by the understanding, respectively. By contrast, a recent influential reading has argued that the two notions can be fused into one and that space as such is first generated by the understanding through an act of synthesis of the imagination. Against this reading, this article argues that a key characteristic of space as a form of intuition is its nonconceptual unity, which defines the properties of space and is as such necessarily independent of determination by the understanding through the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. The conceptual unity that the understanding prescribes to the manifold in intuition, by means of the categories, defines the formal intuition. Furthermore, this article argues that it is the sui generis, nonconceptual unity of space, when takenas a unity for the understanding by means of conceptual determination, that first enables geometric knowledge and knowledge of spatially located particulars.

A mereological argument for the non‐spatiotemporality of things in themselves

“…Kant's account of the unity of space has been a topic of significant investigation in its own right, but this issue is orthogonal to my concerns here. See, e.g., Messina (), McLear (), Onof and Schulting (), and Longuenesse (, ).…”

The current status of research on Kant´s Transcendental Deduction

“…As James Conant, in his excellent programmatic recent essay (Conant 2016)-in my opinion, one of the best articles on the Deduction of the last twenty years or so-delineates in detail in terms of what he calls 'exegetical puzzles', there is, first, the issue of the relationship between the Transcendental Deduction and the Transcendental Aesthetic, secondly, the relation between the A-and B-Deduction, and thirdly, the relation between the so-called 'first' and 'second steps' of the B-Deduction. Some aspects of these 'puzzles' have recently been debated more intensely than before; for example, a spate of articles on Kant's notion of space in relation to the role of the understanding (Friedman 2012;Land 2014;Messina 2014;McLear 2015;Onof and Schulting 2015;Blomme 2017;Williams 2018;Roche 2018; see also Vinci 2015) have brought to light the difficulties in assessing the first exegetical puzzle. In addressing this puzzle in the context of interpreting the structure and argumentative thrust of the Deduction, the results of this newer research must be taken into account.…”

Volumen completo REK 3.1

“…As James Conant, in his excellent programmatic recent essay (Conant 2016)-in my opinion, one of the best articles on the Deduction of the last twenty years or so-delineates in detail in terms of what he calls 'exegetical puzzles', there is, first, the issue of the relationship between the Transcendental Deduction and the Transcendental Aesthetic, secondly, the relation between the Aand B-Deduction, and thirdly, the relation between the so-called 'first' and 'second steps' of the B-Deduction. Some aspects of these 'puzzles' have recently been debated more intensely than before; for example, a spate of articles on Kant's notion of space in relation to the role of the understanding 2018;Land 2014;Messina 2014;McLear 2015;Onof and Schulting 2015;Blomme 2017;Williams 2018;Roche 2018; see also Vinci 2015) have brought to light the difficulties in assessing the first exegetical puzzle. In addressing this puzzle in the context of interpreting the structure and argumentative thrust of the Deduction, the results of this newer research must be taken into account.…”