2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.08.006
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Spain and the European sovereign debt crisis

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Cited by 38 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…Gruppe and Lange [37] showed that the Spanish and German government bond yields had a long-term stable relationship. But, they found that the relationship had a structural break at the beginning of 2009, suggesting that the financial market was somewhat efficient and foresaw a higher sovereign debt risk in Spain.…”
Section: Literature Surveymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gruppe and Lange [37] showed that the Spanish and German government bond yields had a long-term stable relationship. But, they found that the relationship had a structural break at the beginning of 2009, suggesting that the financial market was somewhat efficient and foresaw a higher sovereign debt risk in Spain.…”
Section: Literature Surveymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See for example Basse, Friedrich and Kleffner [30] as well as Gruppe and Lange [31] and Basse [32] for a detailed investigation of the impacts on long run relationships caused by the European sovereign debt crisis. As Brand, Buncic and Turunen [33] as well as Kunze, Kramer and Rudschuck [27] have mentioned the ECB's monetary policy and the communication thereof do both influence the term structure of interest rates.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, as many insurance companies across the Eurozone invested in GIIPS sovereign debt, higher sovereign spreads may destabilize insurance companies, and the entire shadow banking system in the Eurozone. These spillovers led to adverse externalities, further destabilizing the system, and imposing major challenges on regulators [12,13]. The resultant financial vulnerability is magnified by ignoring tail risks, and by exposure to moral hazard associated with the belief that the euro project is too big, and politically too important, to fail.…”
Section: Structural Versus Financial Distortionsmentioning
confidence: 99%