Spass Version 2.0

Weidenbach, Christoph; Brahm, Uwe; Hillenbrand, Thomas; Keen, E. Michael; Theobald, Christian; Topic, Dalibor

doi:10.1007/3-540-45620-1_22

Cited by 85 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The csur_cc compiler also collects trust assertions as it analyzes C code, and spits out a collection of Horn clauses which are then fed to an ¿ ¡ solver-currently SPASS [27,26] or the first author's prototype h1 prover. The fact that most clauses are in ¿ ¤…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptographic Protocol Analysis on Real C Code

Goubault-Larrecq

Parrennes

2005

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Implementations of cryptographic protocols, such as OpenSSL for example, contain bugs affecting security, which cannot be detected by just analyzing abstract protocols (e.g., SSL or TLS). We describe how cryptographic protocol verification techniques based on solving clause sets can be applied to detect vulnerabilities of C programs in the Dolev-Yao model, statically. This involves integrating fairly simple pointer analysis techniques with an analysis of which messages an external intruder may collect and forge. This also involves relating concrete run-time data with abstract, logical terms representing messages. To this end, we make use of so-called trust assertions. The output of the analysis is a set of clauses in the decidable class § ¥ , which can then be solved independently. This can be used to establish secrecy properties, and to detect some other bugs.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptographic Protocol Analysis on Real C Code

Goubault-Larrecq

Parrennes

2005

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…The first implementation of case splitting in a resolution theorem prover based on the superposition calculus is SPASS [14], dating from the mid-1990s. The current version of SPASS implements a labelled splitting calculus due to Fietzke and Weidenbach [4], which we have followed.…”

Section: Splitting With Backtrackingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Case Splitting in an Automatic Theorem Prover for Real-Valued Special Functions

Bridge

Paulson

2012

J Autom Reasoning

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Case splitting, with and without backtracking, is compared with straightforward ordered resolution. Both forms of splitting have been implemented for MetiTarski, an automatic theorem prover for real-valued special functions such as exp, ln, sin, cos and tan −1 . The experimental findings confirm the superiority of true backtracking over the simulation of backtracking through the introduction of new predicate symbols, and the superiority of both over straightforward resolution.

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“…Viki obtains the security requirements from the UMLsec elements and the predefined values used in sequence diagrams [15]. Then, these requirements are formalised in First-Order Logic and analysed with automatic theorem provers (e-SETHEO [16] and SPASS [17]) to find a flaw. If a flaw is found, a Prolog engine can be used to generate the attack trace of such flaw and solve it.…”

Section: Securing Provenance Based-auditsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Provenance-Based Audits

Aldeco-Pérez

Moreau

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Given the significant increase of on-line services that require personal information from users, the risk that such information is misused has become an important concern. In such a context, information accountability is desirable since it allows users (and society in general) to decide, by means of audits, whether information is used appropriately. To ensure information accountability, information flow should be made transparent. It has been argued that data provenance can be used as the mechanism to underpin such a transparency. Under these conditions, an audit's quality depends on the quality of the captured provenance information. Thereby, the integrity of provenance information emerges as a decisive issue in the quality of a provenance-based audit. The aim of this paper is to secure provenance-based audits by the inclusion of cryptographic elements in the communication between the involved entities as well as in the provenance representation. This paper also presents a formalisation and an automatic verification of a set of security properties that increase the level of trust in provenance-based audit results.

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Spass Version 2.0

Cited by 85 publications

References 8 publications

Cryptographic Protocol Analysis on Real C Code

Cryptographic Protocol Analysis on Real C Code

Case Splitting in an Automatic Theorem Prover for Real-Valued Special Functions

Securing Provenance-Based Audits

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